

**A Church Responsive:
Understanding and Interpreting the Changing Composition
Of Christianity in Latin America**

John Foster

I am glad that a serious examination of living the gospel is being made among Protestants. There is conflict – God be blessed.¹

--Archbishop Oscar Romero

Latin America has long been steeped in a spirit of authoritarian rule. From the times when swashbuckling conquistadors conquered the native inhabitants in the name of the Catholic Church and the Crown to the current era in which capricious technocrats embezzle the scarce revenues of the state, the poor majority of Latin America has had little say in how its government works. An elite oligarchy, which has been intact since colonial times, still dominates the economic and political institutions of the region while the numerous poor are forced to eek out an existence on frightfully limited resources. In the wake of brutal wars, gross income inequality, abject poverty and other ingrained social injustices, paradigms of centralized leadership, collectivism, and passive resistance remain deeply etched into Latin American culture.

Amidst this cultural legacy, the churches of the predominately Christian population of Latin America have evolved over the past 500 years. Under the sole dominion of the Catholic Church in league with the oligarchy, Latin American churches remained relatively unchanged for three-and-a-half centuries. In the colonial and post-independence contexts, the Catholic Church enjoyed a monopoly over religious life in Latin America. Embodying the ideals of centralized leadership and collective harmony, the Catholic Church served as a legitimizing agent for the state. The religious composition of Latin America began to change, however, in the late 1800's with the first incursion of mainline Protestant missionaries, who exported distinctly different mores from the United States and Europe. These missionaries and the churches they established foreshadowed even greater changes with the advent of conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Significant alterations in Latin America's religious landscape have occurred over the past fifty years. A region once dominated by the Catholic Church in league with the oligarchy is now home to a lively popular religion, largely Pentecostal in nature, that embodies a set of characteristics overwhelmingly geared toward the poor. In contrast to the majority of Latin American institutions that a preponderant oligarchy dominates, the Christian churches, with their autonomous organization, indigenous leadership and explicitly apolitical stance, now appear to be under the influence of the region's vast population living in poverty. Whereas most poor Latin Americans were once born into the Catholic Church, they now have a series of religious options competing for their membership. In light of such religious options, many poor Latin Americans are gravitating to the churches that resound with their cultural heritage. As a result of their competition for members, Latin American churches, in comparison to other civic, economic, and political institutions in the region, are more responsive to their popular constituents.

This popularization of Latin American Christianity generates a series of important questions: why has Protestantism exploded in a region that has traditionally been a Catholic

mainstay? Why have Latin American churches in general become more responsive to the poor and what does their religious realignment signify for Latin America? Will Protestantism and its populist attitude advance social change and promote democratic consolidation? These inquiries have spawned voluminous amounts of scholarship over the past twenty-five years. Latin American dependency theorists claim that the Protestant explosion directly correlates with the penetration of the United States' cultural imperialism, while North American scholars argue that the Protestant movement represents a genuine groundswell movement on the part of the Latin American poor. Whereas some scholars propose Protestantism as a panacea for Latin America's economic, political and social woes, others argue that Protestantism is a tool of oppressive forces in the region.

What renders the majority of these scholars' analyses incomplete, however, is their inability to connect current Protestant trends with the historical role of the church in Latin America as an extension of the state apparatus. In addition, they do not fully evaluate Protestantism's intimate evolution in Latin American culture and its role in precipitating competition for converts among the region's churches. Without such analyses, interpretations of Protestantism's effects on democratic consolidation and society remain inadequate and unsatisfactory. My thesis will contend that: 1) Protestantism introduced iconoclastic mores of autonomy, individualism and, occasionally, active resistance into the Latin American religious marketplace; 2) these mores have interacted and evolved with Catholic cultural norms of authoritarian leadership, collectivism and passive resistance; 3) the evolution of Protestant and Catholic cultural and religious forces has brought about religious competition resulting in Latin American churches, both Catholic and Protestant, realigning with the poor.

By combining elements of imported Protestant values with regional culture, Latin American churches have shifted over time to better respond to the needs of the poor and offer a popular form of religion that resonates with their social circumstances. Indeed, the charismatic and Pentecostal groups that enjoy popularity today are successful because they do not only offer an individual theology and a lively form of worship that gives them an edge in attracting adherents, but they also draw on longstanding Latin American cultural traditions such as authoritarian leadership. Most of all, their unconditionally apolitical stance allows repressive regimes to exploit them for political support. Often glad to receive the favor of governments, charismatic and Pentecostal groups respond kindly to any legitimacy that ruling elites bestow. This reciprocity represents a return to religion serving as an agent of the state.

This essay will trace the evolution of Latin America's churches to their current popular state, which will aid in comprehending why they are growing so rapidly. Also, the ability to understand the evolution of Latin American churches will facilitate in judging whether or not their realignment with the poor resulting from religious competition will bring about democratic consolidation and social transformation. Accordingly, I will begin with a history of scholarship on Protestantism in Latin America and qualify my contribution to its evolving study. Next, I will explain an economic model by which to understand religious competition in the region. Continuing with an analysis of Protestant typologies and their involvement in the culture, I will identify the concomitant shifts in Latin America's religious marketplace. Drawing on the results from this cultural and historical evolution, I will conclude with my own assessment of whether or not Latin American churches' realignment with the poor represents a possibility for social change in the region.

I. History of the Study of Protestantism in Latin America

In the United States, when people speak of the religious landscape in Latin America, they visualize a Catholic stronghold. Examples that reinforce such a perception include current events like Pope John Paul II's historic trip to Mexico City to canonize the first indigenous saint, Juan Diego, and the fact that the next Pope has a strong chance of being selected from Latin America. Still, the Catholic Church in Latin America today looks markedly different from the colonial era in which bishops and priests were puppets of the state apparatus.

In the photos of the Pope's recent mass to commemorate Juan Diego's canonization in the Basilica of the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico City, the poor constitute a striking majority of the crowd. Their momentous presence and passionate outpouring for Pope John Paul II seemed to indicate that he is *their* religious leader. His words, rife with assurance for those who suffer from poverty and affliction, were slanted toward the audience. Yet this occasion was not absent of political undertones for the Catholic Church. By canonizing the Indian peasant Juan Diego, the Pope sent a clear message that the Catholic Church is especially interested in protecting its base among the poor, which he and many others now perceive as threatened by the onslaught of Protestant groups. In a cautionary address in Guatemala City in 1996, he went so far as to claim that Latin America's Protestants sects "sow confusion and uncertainty among Catholics."²

The aging pontiff has every reason to be concerned about the overwhelming explosion of Protestant groups, the "other side" of Christianity in Latin America. Since 1930, the number of Protestants in region has skyrocketed more than 1900% to comprise 50 million people, or approximately ten percent of the population.³ Mostly charismatic and Pentecostal in nature, Protestants in Latin America now represent over a quarter of the population in four countries: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.⁴ This Protestant explosion has generated an intense study of its origins and its effects on the economic, political and social systems of Latin America.

Christian Lalive d'Épinay, a French sociologist who authored seminal research about Protestantism in Chile during the mid-sixties, is often cited as the father of the study of this movement. His book, *El refugio de las masas*, or the *Haven of the Masses*,⁵ identifies Protestantism as an urban phenomenon that offers recent immigrants from the countryside a shelter from and a structure amidst the harsh reality of Latin American mega-city life. By creating a social dynamic that closely mirrors their experience on the Latin American plantation, or *hacienda*, and by providing a Pentecostal or evangelical minister that serves as the *caudillo*, or community strongman, these groups culturally resonate with Latin America's poor.

Though the study of Protestantism progressed throughout the 1970's and 1980's on the part of Latin American theologians and lay scholars about what they referred to as "the invasion of the sects," the two most important pieces of scholarship on Protestantism in Latin America were published outside the region in 1990. David Martin's *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*,⁶ a searing analysis of the growth of conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups in the region, qualifies the movement as the product of a dialectic between what he calls "Ibero-Catholic" and "Anglo-Protestant" cultural forces. Paralleling Protestantism in Latin America with the ascent of Methodism in England and the United States, Martin qualifies the growth of Protestantism in the region as the poor majority's rejection of the status quo.

The other important book, David Stoll's *Is Latin American Turning Protestant? : The Politics of Evangelical Growth*,⁷ explores the controversy surrounding Protestantism as an agent of the United States' cultural exploitation and militarism, a view that many Latin American Catholics and secularists still hold. Though he effectively illustrates the connection between

U.S. military and economic involvement in the region with the work of conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups, Stoll nevertheless indicates that Protestantism's growth is more attributable to a significant portion of the population's genuine embrace and transformation of North American religion.

As the study of Protestantism in Latin America continued to evolve during the early 1990's, scholars began to focus more on the poor among whom the religion was spreading most rapidly. In 1993, David Stoll teamed up with Virginia Garrard-Burnett, an important writer on the topic whose research is centered in Guatemala, to edit a series of essays entitled, *Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America*.⁸ These essays, which cover a broad range of case studies in Latin American countries, analyze the various forces that affect the poor and why they might be attracted to the religious experience that Protestant churches offer in Latin America.

That same year, French sociologist Jean-Pierre Bastian published an essay, "The Metamorphosis of Latin American Protestant Groups: A Sociohistorical Perspective,"⁹ which posited that Protestantism represents a revitalization of folk or popular religion. In his view, which is similar to that of Lalive d'Epinay's, Protestantism's success lies in the fact that it recreates the old rural patterns of life for urban poor and provides them with a logical worldview by which to interpret their new environs. Despite their differences in approach, Bastian, Garrard-Burnett and Stoll all agree that Latin American churches are now primarily of the poor.

Though authors ranging from Lalive d'Epinay to Garrard-Burnett seek to explain the origins the Protestant explosion, most them shy away from forecasting its effects on Latin American politics and society. Such a task first fell to Christian Smith, who analyzed the political implications of the movement in his essay, "The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, and Democratization."¹⁰ He proffers that because of its stress on individualism, visions of moral transformation and development of organizational skills among its adherents, Protestantism will inevitably foster democratic consolidation in Latin America. Smith's comments are echoed in Lawrence E. Harrison's book about Latin American culture, *The Pan-American Dream*,¹¹ which asserts that the spread of Protestantism is a positive development for Latin American society. Newton J. Gaskill countered these claims in his essay, "Rethinking Protestantism and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America."¹² Citing the authoritarian nature of Latin American Protestantism and the facility with which repressive ruling elites are able to co-opt its leaders, Gaskill contends that the movement will not have any great impact on democratic consolidation.

All of these authors offer important thoughts and insights into the development of Protestantism in Latin America. However, they fail to fully tie in the multiple influences that have shaped Protestantism over time. By not completely identifying the extent to which Catholic cultural influences have interacted with Protestantism and by ignoring the traditional role of the church serving as a legitimizing agent for the state, these authors' analyses of the growth of Protestantism and their projections about the movement's effects on politics and society remain incomplete. As I contend, highlighting the cultural factors that have molded Protestantism in conjunction with tracing the religious competition that it has precipitated in the region demonstrate why Latin American churches are increasingly linked with the experience of the poor. My approach will provide insight into the dynamic development of Latin American churches over time, which will in turn help qualify what effect, if any, their siding with the poor will have on democratic consolidation and social transformation in Latin America.

II. The Model of Religious Economies

A helpful lens for viewing this transformation in Latin American churches is Roger Finke and Rodney Stark's model of "religious economies," which they proposed in their 1992 study, *The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy*.¹³ Their theory states that:

Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market made up of a set of current and potential buyers and a set of firms seeking to serve that market. The relative success of religious bodies (especially when they are confronted with an unregulated economy) will depend upon their clergy, their religious doctrine, and their evangelization techniques.¹⁴

For the intents and purposes for this study, the firms in the religious economy of Latin America are Christian churches and the potential buyers are the multitude of possible parishioners, mostly the poor.

One benefit of using this model of religious economies is that it demonstrates that changes in the Latin American religious marketplace have taken place over time. In such a marketplace, perfect competition, or the economic concept stating that buyers are fully informed about and have universal access to the products that competitive firms are offering, could never occur. At no one time was mainline Protestantism, liberation theology Catholicism, Pentecostalism, etc., available to every Latin American. Instead, a dynamic evolution in the Latin American religious marketplace occurred over a span of approximately 150 years to bring about the present alignment with the poor.

This model is also advantageous because it underscores the fact that shifts in the Latin American religious market have occurred as a response to intense competition for converts. When the Catholic Church was the only religious institution in Latin America, it did not have to compete for parishioners. As an extension of the state apparatus, it enjoyed unchallenged spiritual dominion over the population. However, since the breakup of the Catholic monopoly during the liberal reform movements of the late nineteenth century, an "unregulated economy" has permitted different churches to vie for the loyalty of parishioners. Catholics and Protestants offer various "goods and services," to "potential buyers" such as leadership, pastoral care, and theology. In turn, parishioners gravitate to the churches that "serve" them best. In this sense, the very nature of competition in the religious marketplace mandates that churches be responsive to their parishioners in order to maintain their membership.

In Latin America, this contest for membership has caused churches not only to be responsive to their constituents but also to each other. If a particular "product" is successful in attracting parishioners, the entire array of Catholic and Protestant churches is wont to respond in a similar fashion. In this manner, the religious marketplace is a fluid one in which sweeping changes have taken place over time.

Also, an integral component of this responsiveness in competition is cultural resonance. To be successful in Latin America's religious marketplace, churches must respond to market forces, which require that their offerings cater to the poor whom they are trying to attract. In the second component of the thesis of this essay, which states that Protestant mores have evolved in and interacted with Catholic cultural norms, the terms "evolve" and "interact" necessarily mean that elements of both value sets have fused together to create a product more amenable to the poor.

In this manner, the story of the popularization of Christianity in Latin America is synonymous with the advent of a religion that successfully combines elements of the culture with

components that make it suited to spread. Again, the Pentecostal sects that now constitute a majority of Protestant churches in Latin America, not to mention the “Pentecostalized” mainline Catholic and Protestant denominations, are highly successful because they offer individual theology and lively worship that attract congregants and draw upon culturally ingrained paradigms of authoritarian leadership. Also, paralleling the historic function of the church in Latin America, these churches are easily susceptible to the co-optative efforts of Latin American rulers.

In their book, *Latin American Religion in Motion*,¹⁵ Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy use this model of religious economies to analyze religious competition in the limited context of an urban area. They present the example of a current Catholic diocese struggling to redraw parish lines in the wake of rapidly spreading Pentecostal churches. In this specific case, they emphasize how Pentecostal groups are more apt to survive in an urban context. In my study, however, I will take the model of religious economies and apply it to the churches in Latin America since the breakup of the Catholic monopoly to demonstrate that Protestantism introduced foreign values into Latin America’s religious marketplace, which ultimately interplayed with the Catholic culture. This interaction generated religious competition for converts that resulted in Latin American churches realigning with the poor.

Using typologies of Latin American Protestantism adapted from Samuel J. Escobar’s essay, “A Missiological approach to Latin American Protestantism,”¹⁶ I will show how the two waves of Protestantism along with their historical circumstances brought about this religious competition that caused Latin American churches to better respond to the needs of the region’s impoverished majority. In each successive wave, Protestantism brought a new dynamic to the religious marketplace and elicited a competitive response from the Catholic Church. Analysis of this competition will also be instructive about the current role of Protestantism in Latin America and aid in qualifying the significance of the movement for the region in the final component of this essay.

III. Typologies and Shifts in the Latin America’s Religious Marketplace

A. The Colonial Economy and Catholic Dominance

The same year that Columbus arrived in the New World, the fanatic Catholicism that helped to consolidate the Spanish empire finally triumphed as the motivating force for the Spanish in driving out the Islamic Almohad dynasty from Granada and expelling the Jews from the country. After a 700-year war of reconquest under the aegis of the Catholic Church, the operations of the Spanish crown were deeply involved with the mission of the church. As Spain established colonies throughout present-day Latin America, it governed along with the Catholic Church. For almost three-and-a-half centuries after Dominican friars justified the conquistadors’ claims for the kingdom of Spain in return for the ability to set up missions, the Catholic Church commanded unparalleled influence as the legitimizing agent for the state. Concomitant with this role, the Church held a religious monopoly over the public.

In league with the Crown, the Catholic Church lent authority to the operations of the empire. When Spanish settlers initially needed labor to construct their colonies, the Catholic Church sanctioned the slavery of the native peoples through requiring plantation owners to convert them to Catholicism. As the colonial viceroyalty system of governance emerged, the Catholic Church served as an important administrative arm of Latin American governments. Both the Crown and the Catholic Church were highly centralized patriarchal institutions whose

authority went unchallenged for three hundred and fifty years in the region. They embodied what Christian Smith calls “monistic corporatism,” which,

[. . .] maintains, in short, that humans find true fulfillment in a well-ordered, organic community, the components of which are harmonized by a central authority to achieve the collective goal of the common good. In this view, a good society does not check and balance opposing social and political factions through competition, but integrates or eliminates them in the name of collective harmony. Accordingly, a well-ordered society is regulated from the top down by a centralized, patrimonialist state that structures the community, horizontally, as a hierarchy of class and caste and, vertically, as a coordinated arrangement of pillared social sectors corresponding to the traditional estates of Church, army, landowners, universities, organized labor, and so on.¹⁷

Monistic corporatism, a synonym for authoritarian collectivism, describes the Catholic Church’s monopoly over religious life Latin America during the colonial and post-colonial contexts. Monistic corporatism is a profoundly undemocratic force and social paradigm that has prevented democracy from taking hold in both the economic and political spheres of Latin America. Its influence remains visible in the region in the form of communist strong men such as Fidel Castro in Cuba and socialist presidents like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Still, Latin American churches have been forced to reckon with the culturally ingrained forces of monistic corporatism in an effort to maintain relevance for the people to whom they are evangelizing.

Even after the wars of independence from Spain during the early 1800’s, the Catholic Church served as a strong consolidating force in the vacuum of power that ensued in absence of the Crown. According to Bastian, “The radical preeminence of whites over Indians and people of mixed race continued virtually unchanged by the political independence movements of the early nineteenth century, when elite Creoles (who were white) supplanted Iberian power.”¹⁸ These Creole landowners used the Church as a mechanism to maintain social order. Socially stratified in a *hacienda* system, the landed elites kept any form of heterodox religion, defined as deviating from the Catholicism that they controlled, at bay from their peasant workers.¹⁹

This colonial and post-independence legacy of the Catholic Church demonstrates its role as an agent of legitimacy for the state. It also draws to the fore how this intimacy with the state allowed the Catholic Church to maintain its monopoly over religion in Latin America. Profoundly centralized and authoritarian like the governments it served, the Catholic Church played an important role in maintaining order and tradition in the region. In such a capacity, the Catholic Church was apathetic to needs of its popular elements. Even when cyclical economic and natural disasters took a heavy toll on Latin America’s poor, the Catholic Church remained aloof and complacent in its status of favor with the state.

B. Economic Changes and the Arrival of Mainline Protestant Missionaries

The religious landscape began to change, however, when Latin America became increasingly integrated into the global economic system as a provider of commodities and other raw materials. As the region’s economies became more reliant on the investment of foreign capital, Latin American leaders grew in receptivity to external influences. Their authority often rested upon the maintenance of export markets for the resources that the economic elite controlled.²⁰ Because of these changes in the source of their legitimacy, government officers became less concerned about their relationship with the Catholic Church. Attendant with their desire to strengthen financial ties with powerful trading partners such as Britain and the United

States, many liberal Latin American leaders deliberately sought to bolster cultural exchange, which included religion.

Early on, Protestantism was identified as a progressive force in Latin America because of its promotion of democratic ideals and correlation with economically prosperous nations. For the first time since colonization, Latin American leaders welcomed Protestant missionaries. In assessing this shift in Central America, Garrard-Burnett writes:

It was only during the last decades of the nineteenth century that liberal leaders withdrew the legal restrictions on limited religious diversity and allowed missionaries to proselytize the general population. This change occurred because liberal leaders and missionaries shared a similar vision for modern Central America: they hoped to see increased political stability, economic development, and cultural evolution resembling that of the United States.²¹

These favorable impressions on the part of Latin America's leaders allowed mainline Protestant groups to introduce their heterodox values into an otherwise monolithic Latin American culture and religious marketplace.

Protestantism first sprang up in Latin America in the form of what Escobar calls "transplanted" congregations such as Lutheran churches in Chile and Anglican enclaves in Argentina during the 1850's.²² These congregations mostly arose from the demand of immigrants and visiting businessmen from primarily Protestant countries. Mainline denominations such as the Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians ushered in the first real wave of Protestantism when they sent missionaries en masse to Latin America during the 1930's and 1940's. Their inroads represented a watershed erosion of the Catholic monopoly over the Christian Church in Latin America. Though its impact in the general population was initially small, the first wave of Protestantism sowed the seeds of pluralism that would later burgeon in Latin America. Above all, these mainline missionary groups thrived in meeting the needs of the shifting demographics of the region's populace experiencing rampant urbanization. Denominational missionary groups such as the Central America Mission, the Gospel Missionary Union, the Latin America Mission, and the Christian Missionary Alliance witnessed their greatest success in Latin America's cities.²³

In the first half of the twentieth century, the port cities and capitals of Latin American countries witnessed exponential growth. Smith and Prokopy cite the following statistics: "between 1930 and 1940, the urban population of Latin America increased by 39 percent. Then it grew again by another 61 percent from 1948 to 1950."²⁴ Emphasizing this trend's significance for Protestant groups, they write, "It was not until the masses of Latin Americas began moving out of the villages, escaping the power of the landed elite by migrating to the cities, that religious pluralization was able to begin in earnest."²⁵ Protestant missions in Latin American cities gladly welcomed the multitude of new immigrants from the countryside.

Witnessing their apogee after World War II, the first wave of Protestantism laid the foundation for the more conservative groups that would explode later. Before the War, the U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt implemented a "Good Neighbor Policy" toward Latin America in which he pledged to respect the sovereignty of the region's states in addition to increasing their cultural and economic ties with North America.²⁶ Mainline Protestant churches' spirit of democratic values seemed to mesh the hopes of Latin America's poor that their countries could one day become more democratic. In addition to encouraging greater lay participation in the life of the church, Protestant groups' individualistic theology centered around the concept of the priesthood of all believers, which recognized the inherent sanctity of each

individual and his or her ability to have a personal relationship with God. Such a concept sharply contrasted with the patriarchal theology and ecclesiastical life of the Catholic Church, which enshrined collective values and did little to actively address the concerns of the poor.

Protestant churches' organizational structure also offered a markedly different approach than their Catholic counterparts. Independence from a hierarchy allowed Protestants to better meet the needs of the swelling urban population while the Catholic Church strained to expand parishes and provide enough clergy. Although denominational bodies in the United States sponsored Protestant groups, they enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy in comparison to Catholic churches.

With their introduction democratic theology, participatory worship, and autonomous organizational structure, mainline Protestantism represented the first real challenge to the Catholic monopoly in Latin America. Their ethos drastically departed from the spirit of monistic corporatism and brought extraneous mores into the religious marketplace of Latin America. The mainline Protestants made limited gains in converts, mostly in urban areas. Their ranks did not swell, however, because of their lack of cultural resonance. Mainline Protestants' emphasis on religious texts and moderated forms of worship did not attract the largely illiterate, indigenous poor of Latin America, who were accustomed to animated forms of worship.

The political situation of these countries also did not aid in the spread of mainline Protestantism. Shortly after World War II, the pace of economic change severely slowed in Latin America. By the early 1960's, the policies of populist leaders such as Cardenas in Mexico, Perón in Argentina, and Vargas in Brazil, were flagging.²⁷ Hopes that the nascent middle class could gain political power and economic prosperity were dashed in the reality of quadruple digit inflation and soaring foreign debt. Economic policies that tried to make Latin American countries more self-sufficient were structurally incomplete and ironically brought about an increased reliance on foreign powers like the United States. As economic bedlam took hold, pressure mounted on the part of the elite and international investors to control the situation. Also, communism had become a greater threat in Latin America after the successful Cuban Revolution of 1959. Again, the culturally ingrained concept of monistic corporatism surfaced as members of Latin America's oligarchy sought a solution to their problems in the instillation of powerful bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.

In this political climate, the progressive ideals that these mainline Protestant groups vaunted and the civic mobilization that they encouraged seemed increasingly dangerous. Some mainline Protestant churches that criticized the government and encouraged their parishioners to join guerilla fronts suffered became the victims of state-sponsored counterrevolutionary campaigns.²⁸ But even in the wake of persecution, mainline Protestant churches identified their role as one of service to the oppressed. In the spirit of competition in the religious marketplace, the Catholic Church took notice of these Protestant values and formulated their own response to compete with mainline Protestantism's inroads with the poor.

C. The Rise of Repressive Regimes and the advent of Liberation Theology

By the time bureaucratic authoritarian regimes took hold in Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966, and Chile 1973, liberation theology, which I qualify as an appreciative response by elements of the Catholic Church to the democratic theology and organizational polity of mainline Protestant churches, was alive and well in Latin America.²⁹ Grounded in the work of theologians such as Gustav Gutierrez, liberation theology claims that the Bible, beginning with Moses freeing the Israelites from Egyptian oppression and extending to Jesus unshackling humanity

from the powers that be, is essentially a clarion call for Christians to liberate the poor from all forms of subjugation.

Liberation theologians identified Jesus' pronouncement of his ministry in the temple at Nazareth to be the primary vocation of the Christian Church: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor."³⁰ Consequently, they encouraged priests and other church workers to sensitize their parishioners to the unjust economic and political systems of which they were victims. They also admonished them to lead the struggle for genuine social transformation. The organizational model that liberation theologians put forth for spreading their message was the Ecclesiastical Base Community. Usually comprised of a small group of people living together in intentional association, the Ecclesiastical Base Community was intended to generate the grass roots support necessary to effect structural change in Latin American society.

In line with the model of religious economies, I qualify the success of mainline Protestantism's organizational structure and the relevance of its democratic theology in the midst of brutal repression as the elements that precipitated the Catholic Church's response of liberation theology. As David Martin contends, "Liberation theology represents a continuation both of sectarian Protestant motifs and of this political and ecclesiastical radicalism. The point is that Catholicism itself was bringing into existence elements of Protestantism through Catholic Action and Liberation Theology."³¹ For the first time in its history in Latin America, a sector of the Catholic Church was, in an overtly theological and organizational manner, making a concerted effort to realign itself with the poor in response to what David Stoll calls, "[. . .] the crisis of the Catholic Church [. . .] to recover a popular base."³² Forces of religious competition, in conjunction with momentous social strife, helped precipitate this shift on the part of the Catholic Church away from the oligarchy which it had supported for so long.

Using an example from Central America, Stoll writes that, "Seeing their people slaughtered for trying to exercise their rights, [. . .] Catholic clergy in Guatemala and El Salvador told peasants that rising up against the authorities could be a Christian cause."³³ As a result of liberation theology sweeping through the Catholic clergy in Latin America, many in its ranks turned against oppressive bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. They perceived that the needs of the poor were grounded in a struggle to reform the economic and political systems that oppressed them. For the liberationists, sin was located in the system, rather than in the self.

However, the demonizing of a "sinful system" did little to change the reality of the poor. Like mainline Protestantism before it, liberation theology was largely academic and abstract in its approach, so it too did not culturally resonate with the poor. In spite of its scriptural grounding and social relevance, liberation theology was not universally or even well received by the poor, as evidenced by its limited gains in the realm of adherents. Stoll points out that,

The central exercise of liberation theology, consciousness-raising, raises a tangle of issues. To begin with, there is the risk of failing to speak to the actual needs of the poor, as opposed to idealized versions of their own needs. Liberation theology endeavors to come out of the day-to-day experience of the poor: when successful, maybe it does.³⁴

Escobar, in his criticism of liberation theology identifies many of the same flaws that Stoll portrays:

Observers and scholars have had to come to terms with the fact that, in spite of all good theory and good intentions, many actions in favour of the

poor were tainted by a paternalistic approach. Social and political conscientization took the form of a struggle for the poor, trying to create a more just society for them rather than with them.³⁵

Both of these quotations illustrate that liberation theology was the Catholic Church's attempt to prove itself relevant to the poor majority of Latin America. Again, I claim that based on its adoption of Protestant organizational structures in the form of Ecclesiastical Base Communities and its insistence on the social implications of Christianity, as mainline denominations did to a lesser extent, liberation theology was a movement largely wrought out the competition that Protestantism precipitated in the religious marketplace.

Although liberation theology sought to address the concerns of the poor, the resistance that it spawned tragically exacerbated their plight. During the 1970's and 1980's, over eight hundred Catholic Church leaders, including nuns, were brutally assassinated for their connection with "subversive teachings."³⁶ Probably the most notable among them, Oscar Romero, the Salvadoran Arch-Bishop, was executed by a paramilitary sniper while giving the Eucharist. Many parishioners met the same fate. Furthering his criticism of liberation theology, Stoll points out that, "The kinds of defiance liberation theology tends to encourage [. . .] have been suicidal in many times and places."³⁷ In spite of their religious affiliation, churches represented a threat when they questioned the legitimacy of the state. After divorcing themselves with powerful governments, the Catholic Church was vulnerable to the same persecution that other civic groups in Latin America suffered. The poor to whom they were attempting to evangelize had no desire to experience any additional persecution.

As Stoll goes on to assert: "Perhaps the basic difficulty is that a message centering around "liberation" contradicts how the poor usually prefer to deal with oppressive situations: a subtle combination of deference, foot-dragging, and evasion [. . .]."³⁸ This quotation highlights the necessity of cultural resonance on the part of churches competing in the religious marketplace. Active resistance has never been a part of Latin American culture and even when Protestants encouraged resistance to oppression, they did so gingerly. Mainline Protestantism and the liberation theology movements were also devoid of the authoritarian leadership to which the Latin American poor were accustomed. Indeed, their absence of cultural congruity helps to illustrate why conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups have triumphed in the region and emerged as the chief competitors in the religious marketplace.

D. Civil Unrest and the Deluge of Conservative Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism

Pentecostalism grew out of the holiness movement in American Methodism at the beginning of the twentieth century. It combined John Wesley's teaching that humans have the possibility through moral redemption to become perfect, the so-called second blessing, with a belief in the "gifts of the spirit," which include a radical conversion experience and glossolalia, the revealing of prophecy and speaking in tongues. Conservative evangelical churches share Pentecostalism's uncompromising moralism, but they do not believe in the "gifts of the spirit." Due to their insistence on the adoption of strict moral standards, both movements demand the cessation of tobacco and alcohol use. They also require that adherents evangelize to others, in accordance with Jesus' "Great Commission."³⁹ Pentecostalism and conservative evangelicalism, with their strict rules and otherworldly attitude, were attractive to the American poor who felt alienated amidst the changing economic and political landscape of the United States.⁴⁰

In much the same way, conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism have provided a shelter from the harsh realities of life under oppressive bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in

Latin America. The human cost of inflation, the brunt of neo-liberal economic policies, and the overall degradation of traditional community life caused the poor to seek out shelter in these religious movements. Unlike their predecessors in the religious marketplace, conservative evangelicals and Pentecostals mirrored the cultural heritage of the Latin American poor. Functioning as a refuge from the anomie that most poor people experience in the face of a seemingly uncontrollable world, this second wave of Protestantism is deeply rooted in the experience of the destitute. In contrast to the humble jobs in the cities and the brutal toil of subsistence agriculture in the countryside, “Protestantism, and particularly the Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches with their emphasis on individual expression [. . .] provide spaces in which believers can construct and express a sense of personal dignity and community,”⁴¹ as Newton J. Gaskill observes.

Despite the egalitarianism it promotes among parishioners, this strain of Protestantism draws upon the spirit of monistic corporatism that is profoundly ingrained into the collective consciousness of the Latin American poor. As Lalive d’Epinay identified in his research of the early Pentecostal communities in Chile, the minister in these congregations is wrought out of the long tradition of the *caudillo* in Latin America. And, as David Martin asserts, “To say that Pentecostalism reproduces some of the characteristics of *caudillismo* (authoritarian leadership) and of ‘patriarchal relations’ on the hacienda is to say that it lies close to the social roots.”⁴² The model of the authoritarian leader is integral in providing cultural resonance in the religious marketplace.

Still, conservative evangelical and Pentecostal theology is democratic in the sense that it encourages lay participation and engagement. As Cecilia Mariz asserts in her essay, “Religion and Poverty in Brazil: A Comparison of Catholic and Pentecostal Communities,”

The experiences of revealed knowledge and the assumption that any member can relate directly to God allow the development of lay leadership [. . .] Pentecostal churches consist of relatively independent small groups that are mainly led by ordinary people who have ample opportunities to develop organizational skills [. . .].⁴³

The genius of this brand of Protestantism lies in its ability to simultaneously offer a religious experience that genuinely involves the poor in the life of the church but also relies on the time-tested tradition of an authoritarian ruler who provides security and structure. In this manner, the success of conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism in Latin America’s religious marketplace is due to their adaptability to the circumstances of the poor.

In contrast to mainline Protestantism and liberation theology, conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are decidedly more engaged with the reality of the downtrodden. Drawing on social paradigms and ingrained cultural practices, evangelical and Pentecostal groups give a greater voice to the poor. As Bastian asserts,

In general, the Protestant movements of the nineteenth century arose from the political culture of radical liberalism, which was democratic and promoted individual free will. The current popular Protestant movements, in contrast, derive from the religious culture of popular, corporatist and authoritarian Catholicism. Whereas nineteenth-century Protestant movements represented a religion of the written word, of civil and rational education, the current popular Protestant movements constitute an oral religion that is unlettered and lively. While the former were vehicles for practices that inculcated democratic liberal

values, the latter are vehicles for caudillo-style models of religious and social control.⁴⁴

Bastian's assertion demonstrates the requisite cultural resonance that these conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups possess. He also underscores why they were more suited to spread in Latin America than mainline Protestantism and liberation theology.

Above all, conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism's staunchly apolitical stance make them easy targets for regimes seeking support among the populace. In their refusal to engage the politics, conservative evangelicals and Pentecostals inadvertently took the historical mantle of the Catholic Church, which had provided legitimacy for the state since colonization. Many of the authoritarian regimes attempted to co-opt these Protestant sects since they were not overtly critical of their policies. In the specific case of Guatemala, Garrard-Burnett writes of how:

[. . .] the apolitical stance of these churches only increased their attractiveness as the country experiences massive political violence and intense guerilla activity. To many the evangelical sects were a relatively safe alternative to the radicalized sector of the Roman Catholic Church. This shift was not lost on Guatemalan army officers who saw the possibility of a new base of support in the countryside to replace that previously enjoyed with the Roman Catholic Church. They sought to capitalize on evangelical respect for the powers that be.⁴⁵

The cooperation of evangelical and Pentecostal groups with the government became so vital that when members of Guatemala's military junta installed a new dictator in 1982, they chose the firebrand Pentecostal and retired general Efraín Ríos Montt. Ríos Montt, who oversaw one of the more brutal phases of Guatemala's counterinsurgency campaign, instructed his generals to distinguish between Pentecostal churches and those that preached liberation theology.⁴⁶ Protestants responded favorably to this new status, as their "[. . .] 'apoliticism' often translated into a more active support of the government [and] the president's evangelical profile lent their faith new legitimacy and practical expediency that it had not enjoyed before."⁴⁷ Such a relationship proves how vulnerable and even welcoming Protestant groups were to government support.

Indeed, the overwhelming gains of the conservative evangelicals and Pentecostals sects during the 1970's and 1980's demonstrate that the poor are much more interested in survival than in the overthrow of oppressive regimes. Their explosive growth demonstrates a sense of ownership on the part of the poor in an institution that closely mirrors, both theologically and organizationally, their experience in the harsh world. Consequently, conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are particularly suited to give voice to the poor. In the midst of an inimical world, they provide the poor with the shelter and the identity they need for coping. With their fusion of authoritarian leadership, individualistic theology, autonomous organization, and, above all, their complicity with the government, conservative evangelical and Pentecostal sects introduced a highly competitive church experience into Latin America's religious marketplace that provoked even greater competition among the Catholics and mainline Protestants.

Consonant with the model of religious competition, a charismatic movement, rooted in the tradition of Pentecostalism, is now spreading rapidly through the Catholic Church in sectors such as Catholic Action and Catholic Charismatic Renewal.⁴⁸ And, as Bastian points out, "[. . .] most of the historic Protestant churches have 'Pentecostalized' themselves during the last thirty years by adopting charismatic practices and thus assuring themselves of continuing growth and

even a rural indigenous base.”⁴⁹ This growth is indicative of the fact that this particular Protestant model has triggered an overwhelming response on the part of the poor and is the most successful contender in Latin America’s religious economy.

In the increasingly intense competition for converts, Catholic and Protestant churches alike are adapting to become more charismatic in an effort to shore up their poor base. The poor seem to be responding in kind, as they are rapidly filling the congregations of charismatic and Pentecostal churches that reflect their social experience. These swelling ranks endorse the religious economy model that aids in understanding the shifts in Latin America’s religious marketplace. Just as the liberation theology movement arose out of a response to the successes of mainline Protestantism, so does the charismatic movement arise out of a response to the successes of conservative evangelicalism and Pentecostalism. Indeed, the growth of these charismatic and Pentecostal congregations is directly correlated to the religious competition that caused them to side with the poor.

IV. Summary of Competition in the Latin American Religious marketplace

Using the model religious economies, I have demonstrated that the Latin American religious marketplace has dynamically evolved over time. Beginning with the erosion of the Catholic monopoly during the liberal reform period, mainline Protestantism introduced a variety of foreign principles into the Latin America’s religious economy. These Protestant principles evolved with Catholic cultural values and eventually precipitated a contest for converts among Latin American churches. In their contest for the allegiance of converts and their attempts to become culturally relevant, Latin American churches realigned with the poor.

This competition was first visible in the development of liberation theology, which appreciatively incorporated mainline Protestant organizational trends and a theology of active resistance. The rise of liberation theology was undoubtedly a direct effort on the part of the Catholic Church to maintain its poor base. Even with its avocation of a preferential option for the poor, liberation theology did not take hold in a culture that was imbued in authoritarian rule. In addition to not resonating with the poor on a cultural level, both liberation theology and mainline Protestantism experienced limited gains because they broke away from the historical role of the church supporting the state. In a region in which the state is all-powerful and there are few civic institutions to mitigate the brunt of governmental decisions, Christian churches in Latin America function better when ruling regimes favor them with co-optative support.

The support of Latin America’s rulers that arose out conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups’ propensity to be co-opted provided a competitive edge in region’s religious marketplace. As paramilitary death squads brutally assassinated subversive Priests, nuns, and mainline Protestant human rights workers, conservative evangelical and Pentecostal churches remained categorically apolitical. Because rulers viewed these sects in a positive light, they were able to function as a haven for the many poor seeking refuge amidst the violence. Conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups also presented the cultural paradigm of the caudillo in their ministers, which many poor found to be comforting. The individual theology, spirited worship, and emotional release that these ministers preached likewise appealed to the poor.

Conservative evangelicals and Pentecostals also gained a competitive edge in the marketplace of religious competition through using completely autonomous methods of organization. Without any form of hierarchy or governing boards, they were able to spread unchecked. Witnessing much greater gains than mainline Protestantism and liberation theology, these groups appear to be a genuine expression of the experience of the poor. In the words of

David Martin, “[. . .] the North American paradigm seems to show that once religion is no longer a matter of relation of a particular body to the elite and to the state, religion adapts quite successfully to a changing world. In all the *proper* sense of the word it becomes popular.”⁵⁰ Indeed, conservative evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and the charismatic movements they have spawned are the most adept at responding to the religious needs of Latin America’s poor majority. In many ways, they are the culmination of religious competition that Protestant erosion of the Catholic monopoly generated.

With the evolution of Latin American churches explained in the context of religious competition, I will now proceed to judge whether or not the churches’ reorientation with the poor will result in any social transformation or aid in the process of democratic consolidation in the region.

V. Implications and Interpretations of the Protestant Explosion in Latin America

In his essay, “The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, and Democratization in Latin America,” Christian Smith posits that conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups will inevitably serve as agents of democratic consolidation in Latin America. Citing their departure from the monolithic Catholic norm, commitment to moral transformation, and encouragement of lay participation, Smith proffers that, in the long term, these conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups will imminently foment a more democratic society in Latin America. However, Smith’s evidence is purely speculative, as even he admits, “Latin American Protestantism today, it must be conceded, is characteristically conservative, politically withdrawn, and structurally authoritarian.”⁵¹ To think that Protestant groups will somehow enter politics and stimulate democracy is to ignore 500 years of church history in Latin America during which religious institutions have served the interests of the state. Smith also fails to analyze the cultural contexts in which Protestant churches have evolved over time, thus rendering his assessments incorrect and incomplete.

Echoing some of Smith’s contentions, Lawrence E. Harrison, in his controversial book, *The Pan-American Dream*, claims that Latin American countries must surmount what he deems their “backward cultural legacies” in order to become more “progressive” and democratic societies.⁵² Highly biased toward an Anglo-Protestant cultural model, Harrison heralds the explosion of Protestant groups as a positive development. Assessing the implications of the movement he writes:

The spread of Protestantism in part reflects a rejection of the traditional Ibero-Catholic values and institutions that have failed to produce progress for the poor. The Protestants generally attach higher importance to work, education, sobriety, honesty and community responsibility. . . I believe that the adoption of these values will inevitably result in prosperity and upward social mobility for them [. . .].⁵³

Both Harrison and Smith think that because these Protestant groups embody some of the hallmark values of progressive western culture, they will “inevitably” bring about positive cultural change in Latin America. There is no doubt that the rigid standards of moral behavior that conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups insist upon can have life-changing effects for the convert, given that alcoholism and drug use ravage many poor families in Latin America. However, both of these analyses neglect the competitive religious evolution of these sects, the cultural explanation for why these groups have spread among the poor, and the manner in which they have taken up the traditional mantle of the Catholic Church through inadvertently supporting ruling regimes.

As this essay has demonstrated, conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups emerged as the winners in a religious marketplace because they successfully fused together autonomous organizational trends, Catholic norms of authoritarian leadership, and passivity vis-à-vis the state. They largely served as a refuge for the persecuted poor and won the esteem of military leaders looking for uncritical sources of support. Such a legacy strongly dictates against the assertion that conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups represent latent elements of change or agents of democratic consolidation in Latin American society.

My claims are supported by the work of Newton J. Gaskill, who responded to Smith in his essay, "Rethinking Protestantism and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Addressing assertions such as Harrison's that conservative evangelicals and Pentecostals instill in their adherents moral values that will result in their upward mobility, Gaskill writes, "Pentecostal churches that account for the overwhelming majority of the Protestant population do not, in general, seem to endow work with a sense of calling or drive their adherents to aspire towards positions of general social prestige in society any more than do the other Latin American religious traditions."⁵⁴ According to Gaskill, conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups operate in the same clientilistic fashion in which Latin American governments do by cooperating with repressive regimes to ensure their perpetuity.⁵⁵ Like Latin American governments, these groups are concerned with their own survival, which makes them susceptible to the favor of repressive regimes looking for unquestioning support.

Taken in concert with their authoritarian values and other cultural elements, the ease with which conservative evangelical and Pentecostal groups are co-opted leads Gaskill to conclude that:

While the empirical literature is still small it gives us no particular reason to believe that Protestants intrinsically constitute a cultural or organizational opposition to patterns and structures of traditional, authoritarian political and social domination in the democratic era. Indeed, some organizational forms of Protestantism seem to encourage the incorporation of Protestants into the particularistic, patron-client politics characteristic of Latin America's traditional and authoritarian regimes. Nor can we assume that Protestant conversion always implies a break with, or that it will stand as a bulwark, against the reemergence of authoritarian attitudes and practices among political actors and populations.⁵⁶

In his essay, Gaskill makes a compelling case as to why Latin American Protestantism will not serve as an agent of democratic consolidation. His essay heavily concentrates on the susceptibility of Protestant leaders, especially Pentecostal ones, to the co-optative efforts of Latin American governments. However, he does not place this trend in the context of the historical role of the church enjoying a mutual relationship of legitimacy with the state. Although he analyzes Latin American cultural trends, he fails to see the current conservative evangelical and Pentecostal movements as the product of an evolution within the region's religious marketplace over time.

VI. Conclusion

The evidence generated from tracing the evolution of Latin American religious marketplace strongly rules against popular charismatic and Pentecostal churches from ever serving as catalysts for democratic consolidation and meaningful social change in the region. Wrought out of a process of religious competition in which they emerged as the most culturally

resonant groups, charismatic and Pentecostal churches draw heavily on entrenched Latin American paradigms such as authoritarian leadership. Also, their emphatically apolitical stance allows authoritarian regimes to co-opt them easily for support. At their core, charismatic and Pentecostal groups are exactly what the consumers in Latin America's dynamic religious marketplace desire: a refuge from their brutal reality with no strings attached.

Works Cited

- Catherine L. Albanese. America, Religions and Religion. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981.
- Bastian, Jean-Pierre. "The Metamorphosis of Latin American Protestant Groups: A Sociohistorical Perspective." Latin American Research Review 28.2 (1993): 33-61.
- Escobar, Samuel J. "A missiological approach to Latin American Protestantism." International Review of Mission 87.345 (1998): 161-173.
- Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark. The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers UP, 1992.
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. Protestantism in Guatemala. Austin: Texas UP, 1998.
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. "Protestantism in Latin America." Latin American Research Review 27.1 (1992): 218-230.
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia and David Stoll, eds. Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1993.
- Gaskill, Newton J. "Rethinking Protestantism and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Sociology of Religion 58.1 (1997): 69-91.
- The HarperCollins Study Bible. New Revised Standard Version. New York: HarperCollins, 1993.
- Harrison, Lawrence E. The Pan American Dream. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
- Lalive d'Epinau, Christian. Haven of the masses: a study of the Pentecostal movement in Chile. Trans. Marjorie Sandle London: Lutterworth Press, 1969.
- Mariz, Cecilia. "Religion and Poverty in Brazil: A Comparison of Catholic and Pentecostal Communities," Sociological Analysis. 53.4 (1992): 63-70.
- Martin, David. Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Mcateer, Michael. "Pope Battles for Latin America's Catholic Soul." Anglican Journal. (1999) 2 Dec. 2002. <<http://www.anglicanjournal.com/125/03/world05.html>>.

Romero, Oscar. The Violence of Love. Trans. James R. Brockman. Sussex, TN: Plough, 1988.

Sachs,Jeffery D. "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America." Conference on Markets, Institutions, and Cooperations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance. Venice. Oct. 1998.

Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford, 2001.

Smith, Christian. "The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, and Democratization in Latin America." Sociology of Religion. 55.2 (1994): 119-144.

Smith, Christian and Joshua Prokopy eds. Latin American Religion in Motion. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Stoll, David. Is Latin America turning Protestant? : The Politics of Evangelical Growth. Berkeley: California UP, 1990.

Stream, Carol. "John Paul Woos Straying Flock." Christianity Today. 40.4 (1996): 94.

Winn, Peter. Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. London: California UP, 1992.

¹ Oscar Romero, The Violence of Love. Trans. James R. Brockman. (Sussex, TN: Plough, 1988) 26.

² Carol Stream, "John Paul Woos Straying Flock." Christianity Today. 40.4 (1996) 94.

³ Michael Mcateer, "Pope Battles for Latin America's Catholic Soul." Anglican Journal. (1999), 2 Dec. 2002 <<http://www.anglicanjournal.com/125/03/world05.html>>.

⁴ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Protestantism in Latin America." Latin American Research Review 27.1 (1992) 219.

⁵ Christian Lalive d'Epinay, Haven of the masses: a study of the Pentecostal movement in Chile. Trans. Marjorie Sandle. (London: Lutterworth Press, 1969).

⁶ David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

⁷ David Stoll, Is Latin America turning Protestant? : The Politics of Evangelical Growth. (Berkeley: California UP, 1990).

⁸ Virginia Garrard-Burnett and David Stoll, eds., Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1993).

⁹ Jean-Pierre Bastian, "The Metamorphosis of Latin American Protestant Groups: A Sociohistorical Perspective." Latin American Research Review 28.2 (1993).

¹⁰ Smith, Christian. "The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, and Democratization in Latin America." Sociology of Religion 55.2 (1994) 119-144.

-
- ¹¹ Lawrence E. Harrison, The Pan American Dream. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
- ¹² Newton J Gaskill, "Rethinking Protestantism and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Sociology of Religion 58.1 (1997) 69-91.
- ¹³ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in, Our Religious Economy. (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers UP, 1992).
- ¹⁴ Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy, eds., Latin American Religion in Motion. (New York: Routledge, 1999).
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Samuel J. Escobar, "A missiological approach to Latin American Protestantism." International Review of Mission 87.345 (1998) 161-173.
- ¹⁷ Christian Smith, 121.
- ¹⁸ Jean-Pierre Bastian, 36.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 36.
- ²⁰ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America. (New York: Oxford, 2001) 43-51.
- ²¹ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Protestantism in Latin America." 220.
- ²² Samuel J. Escobar, 162.
- ²³ Ibid., 163.
- ²⁴ Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy, 6.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 4.
- ²⁶ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, 236.
- ²⁷ Jeffery D. Sachs, "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America." Conference on Markets, Institutions, and Cooperations: Labour Relations and Economic Performance. (Venice. Oct. 1998) 1-31.
- ²⁸ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Protestantism in Guatemala. (Austin: Texas UP, 1998) 136.
- ²⁹ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, 56.
- ³⁰ Luke 4:18-19. The HarperCollins Study Bible. New Revised Standard Version. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).
- ³¹ David Martin, 290.
- ³² David Stoll, 312.
- ³³ Ibid., 142.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 312.
- ³⁵ Samuel J. Escobar, 170.
- ³⁶ Peter Winn, Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. (London: California UP, 1992) 348.
- ³⁷ David Stoll, 313.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 313.
- ³⁹ Matthew 28:16-20. The HarperCollins Study Bible. New Revised Standard Version. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).
- ⁴⁰ Catherine L. Albanese. America, Religions and Religion. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981) 241-243.
- ⁴¹ Newton J. Gaskill, 74.
- ⁴² David Martin, 282.
- ⁴³ Cecilia Mariz, "Religion and Poverty in Brazil: A Comparison of Catholic and Pentecostal Communities." Sociological Analysis. 53.4 (1992) 63.
- ⁴⁴ Jean-Pierre Bastian, 53.
- ⁴⁵ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Protestantism in Guatemala, 253.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 136.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 154.
- ⁴⁸ Jean-Pierre Bastian, 53.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 45.
- ⁵⁰ David Martin, 295
- ⁵¹ Christian Smith, 130.
- ⁵² Lawrence E. Harrion, 261.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 82-83.
- ⁵⁴ Newton J. Gaskill, 78.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 80.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, 86-87.