

Fujimori's Brand of Populism

Boyd Stephenson

Introduction

The 1990s have been a decade of both great hope and apprehension for the advancement of democracy. As the decade opened, the Soviet Union fell; Russia and the other newly independent states quickly reorganized themselves behind the idea of democracy. There was great hope for democracy as a world force. Some even saw democracy as the final world government; others dared to call the fall of the Soviet Union the “end of history.”¹ For the fifteen years before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington's Third Wave of democracy slowly brought elected governments in Southern Europe, East Asia, and especially, Latin America.² Amartya Sen called the rise of democracy the “preeminent” development of the twentieth century.³

Indeed, electoral democracy was on the rise. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, Freedom House's Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties classified 76 countries as democracies. One year later, at the close of 1991, 91 countries ranked as democracies.⁴ However, as the 1990s progressed two trends in world democratization were visible. First of all, several states, such as Nigeria and Belarus, slid backwards towards autocracy. Fortunately, these losses of formal democracy were mitigated by the democratization of other states such as Gabon and South Africa. Despite the relative rise of the number of democracies, there were some troubling features of these democracies. They were technically electoral democracies, that is to say that their governments were selected in reasonably regular free and fair elections, but they did not have the traditional traits found in the older, established democracies of the North Atlantic region. They were what Fareed Zakaria called illiberal democracies. Zakaria notes that, “Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits of their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms...we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life—illiberal democracy.”⁵ Zakaria goes on to argue that quality of life is appreciably better in those states, such as pre-PRC Hong Kong, where the government is effectively authoritarian but civil liberties are both nurtured and respected. Because of this, policy goals should be shifted to encouraging respecting civil liberties, noting their role in the British experience of gradual development, or consolidation, towards liberal democracy.

According to the Freedom House surveys, Zakaria was correct in analyzing the rampant growth of illiberal democracy during the 1990s. Freedom House surveys rate two scales from 1 (most expressive or free) to 7 (least expressive or free). The two scales are for political rights and civil liberties. As Larry Diamond points out in his book, *Developing Democracy*, “In fact, the gap between electoral and liberal democracy has grown markedly during the latter part of the third wave, forming one of its most significant but little-noticed features”.⁶ Due to this fact, social commentators draw several wide-ranging conclusions. They posited end of the third wave and put forth the assumption that we can expect to see reductions in the number and quality of world democracies as we did during the Interwar years and the post-colonial era. While Diamond admits that the third wave may very well be over, he posits a new theory of democratization that:

Democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon. Even when a country is above the threshold of electoral (or even liberal) democracy, democratic institutions can be improved and deepened or may need to be consolidated; political competition can be made fairer and more open; participation can become more inclusive and vigorous; citizens' knowledge of resources, and competence can grow; elected (and appointed) officials can be made more responsive and accountable; civil liberties can be better protected; and the rule of law can become more efficient and secure. Viewed in this way, continued democratic development is a challenge for all countries, including the United States; all democracies, new and established can become more democratic.⁷

Examining all states from this perspective, any state intent on democratizing is in a constant process of progression towards becoming a more liberal democracy. States will certainly move forward in their own ways. Some will jump into providing much greater electoral access and relaxing state repression, such as South Africa when it ended *apartheid*. Others will move gradually into liberal democracy along a course more closely approximated by Mexico. Some will attempt to limit the terms of their national legislatures, only to be beaten back by institutional checks on stupidity already built into their systems.⁸ Finally, some states will appear to slip backwards from liberal democracy and return to authoritarian models.

This paper will consider the development of democracy in a state that slipped backwards: Peru during the administration of Alberto Fujimori. I will examine the state of democracy existing in Peru as Fujimori took office after the 1990 election, its apparent dissolution from the April 5, 1992 *autogolpe* through the 2000 election, and executive moves to discourage the re-emergence of political parties and the executive branch's ascendancy over the other two branches. Finally, I will examine the consequences of the Fujimori regime for both the newly elected Toledo regime and for Peru as a whole.

I then ask the question that although Alberto Fujimori seriously hindered the consolidation of democracy in Peru via "Fujipopulism," did his government have overriding positive effects on Peru—despite his apparent disdain of democracy and constitutional liberalism? Peru is not a case of a failed state (as some could have argued, especially during the closing days of the García administration), but is a democracy that is slowly learning how to be a democracy. As such, most of the actions of the Fujimori regime can be explainable as steps backwards for democracy, but are in fact both good steps for Peru as a whole in the short-run and for Peruvian democratic consolidation in the long run. Due to a combination of expected and unexpected policy effects during Fujimori's administration, several of the roots of both political rights and civil liberties were reawakened and reinstilled in the population. The "Fujishock" caused short-term hardship but corrected a badly mismanaged economy. The windfall revenues from privatization of state owned enterprises allowed for both effectively arming the military by allowing it to work with the *rondos campesinos* to emasculate the Sendero Luminoso and providing funds for much needed infrastructure improvements. These policies were chillingly effective, as Fujimori's landslide reelection victory in 1995 proves.

However, these twin pillars of Fujipopulism, economic austerity and direct public works spending, were incompatible in the long term. As suggested by survey data in


Kurt Weyland's research, despite Fujimori's success in reviving the economy through structural means in the early 1990s, when the economy soured due to *El Niño* and the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Peruvians responded to Fujimori as Americans do to a president during troubled economic times. While Peruvians were more than willing to stand by their president when their economy needed restructuring, the feeling as recession hit in the late 1990s was that the Peruvian economy was structurally sound, just not being encouraged by Fujimori's leadership.⁹ Additionally, by encouraging the development of the *rondos campesinos*, Fujimori encouraged the formation of tightly knit civil society groups. These groups would eventually clamor for a great voice in government—a development that would require a stronger legislature.

From Anti-statist to being the state

In her seminal essay on Peru's political history and its effects through today, Cynthia McClintock states, "Peru is a nation where there has been experience with democratic norms and practices...Peru's history of failure with democracy is not surprising. While in the 1960s many social scientists expected democratic consolidation in Latin America's Southern Cone, they did not in Peru or most other Andean nations."¹⁰ McClintock goes on to describe the unusually powerful roles that race and class disparities have played in Peru's history.

Most of Peru's struggle with democracy can be described by the plight of Peru's first mass-action political party: APRA. APRA was Peru's first institutionalized party and oddly enough a left-leaning party. APRA's goals frightened the ruling Peruvian oligarchy for much of the twentieth century, and much of the nation's political development of the middle of the century centers around conflict between APRA and political elites. It was not until 1985, well after the death of party founder, Haya de la Torre, that APRA successfully seized the presidency of Peru in the form of its new party leader, Alan García.

The García government was troubled from the start. Fulfilling populist campaign promises required spending much of the treasury. Unfortunately, foreign lenders disagreed with the fiscal soundness of such a plan. García first stated that Peru would not pay more than 10% of its total export GDP to service foreign debt and then when Peru's creditors balked at this idea, he defaulted on Peru's debt completely.¹¹ For two years García kept the appearance of a healthy economy by using Peru's foreign reserves to promote local spending. Unfortunately for García, after two years Peru's reserves had run out and there was no money to pay for anything. Because of this financial mismanagement, both García and APRA as a party had been discredited. At the same time, due to raging poverty, especially in the Andean highlands, the Maoist insurrectionists of Sendero Luminoso effectively controlled large swaths of the country and were beginning to encroach upon the capital.



Source: "Fujipopulism and the liberal state in Peru, 1991-1995," Bruce H. Kay. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*. 38.4

The most obvious candidate to win the 1990 election was famous novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. In a 1990 issue of *Third World Quarterly*, Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton describe the effects of Sendero's insurrection on Peru and their ideas of what the future holds for Peru's political stage. They note only one candidate, Vargas Llosa, and the only other party mentioned is the United Left (Izquierda Unida IU).¹² Fujimori and his "movement," Cambio 90, are not mentioned at all. Despite this, as Vargas Llosa continued to attack the mismanagement of the García administration, García retaliated by giving Alberto Fujimori his political endorsement. Fujimori responded craftily. While implicitly accepting García's endorsement, he continued to rail against the mismanagement of the political parties in Peru's history. Finally, Fujimori denounced Vargas Llosa's well-articulated economic restructuring policy as too drastic and announced his support for more gradual changes in the Peruvian economy as a wiser course towards stability.


Fujimori's dark-horse candidacy resonated with voters and while he finished second in the first round elections, all groups threw their support behind him, sending a political unknown with no majority in either house of Congress into the presidential palace. García had essentially left Peru with three important problems and Fujimori's response to those problems would both characterize Fujipopulism and prove to be his final undoing.

Problem 1: An Economy in shambles

At the beginning of Fujimori's first term of office, the García administration had allowed inflation rates to rise to more than 7,500 percent.¹³ Fujimori had argued against Vargas Llosa's "shock" treatment for the Peruvian economy, instead pushing for more gradual reforms. However, when Fujimori went to Washington DC at the beginning of his term, he met with creditors from the World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank. These development organizations would accept nothing less than total shock therapy. Fujimori used the tremendous power the Peruvian Congress traditionally cedes to all incoming presidents in economic regulation to implement the "Fujishock." The Fujishock lowered trade tariffs, removed price controls, and agreed to international control over Peru's budget.¹⁴ Inflation rates dropped drastically during the Fujimori administration.

Problem 2: Maoist Insurrectionists

When Fujimori took office, the Sendero Luminoso Maoist revolutionary group controlled good portions of Peru's territory and had begun an urban campaign attempting to take possession of Lima. The rebels' reach was such that the Southern (primarily highland) provinces were all under direct military control due to states of emergency. Fujimori received large windfall income due to privatization of state owned industries as required by the economic restructuring package that he agreed to. Over the course of just under five years, the Fujimori regime amassed over 3 billion US dollars from privatization sales.



Source: Fujipopulism and the liberal state in Peru, 1991-1995." Bruce H. Kay. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*. 38.4. Values for 1995 only include up to March of that year.

Fujimori was able to use the revenues from privatization to fund two important projects during his presidency. In dealing with the Senderistas, Fujimori used the monies from privatization to increase funding for the badly beaten Peruvian military and to purchase weapons to arm the peasant groups called *rondos campesinos* created to drive off guerilla incursions. More effective and predictable pay for the military not only increased support for Fujimori at the micro-level in making the average more loyal to the Fujimori regime than they had been to the García regime, but it also made the politicization of the military a more tenable option as the military became a more visible priority in the Peruvian state. Furthermore, closer links between the *rondos campesinos* and the Peruvian military allowed the military to act as a campaigning force for Fujimori's reelection bid in 1995, ultimately successful because of his public works and success in defeating Guzman's forces.

Problem 3: A discredited party system

The first thing to note about this problem is that while systems lacking organized political parties are less likely to foster democracy, they are more likely to support strong populist presidents. It is also important to note that although political scientists will point out that political parties are essential to representing the interests of the people, Peru's political parties had failed in that capacity. Parties such as Acción Popular, APRA, and the Izquierda Unida had not fulfilled their promises to represent Peruvians, and had marginalized much of the population. Fujimori was able to use their corruption to

promote himself as a candidate who would represent the interests of the average Peruvian. His nickname, “El Chino,” derives from an earlier derogatory nickname given during 1990 election, “El Chinito.”¹⁵ In Latin America, the diminutive “-ito” suffix is often used as a subtle slur. Fujimori was able to change a subtle slur by elites into a name of respect amongst Peruvians.

Fujimori ran on a platform denouncing the parties in Peru as being corrupt, out of touch with the state as a whole, and puppets for the interests of the landed classes and the wealthy Limeños. While Fujimori was essentially correct on all of these charges, he did not take steps to transform Cambio 90 from a highly decentralized political movement into a more official party. Instead, Fujimori used the utmost of his ability to distance himself from Cambio 90 and the legislature as a whole. Lacking a well-organized party to support him, Fujimori made alliances with Vladmiro Montesinos, installing him as the unofficial head of the National Intelligence Services (SIN). Furthermore, links were consolidated with the military by promoting officers favorable to the idea of politicization of the military while quietly pushing those with reservations aside.

Fujimori was able to accomplish several goals at once. First of all, because all parties were considered discredited at that point in time, El Chino wanted to be considered closer to the Peruvian people than to Cambio 90. However, by distancing himself from his movement’s leadership in Congress, Fujimori lost the pull that a party’s total support could give him in the legislature. However, via the politicization of the military and judicious use of the SIN, Fujimori co-opted the military and used them effectively as his party supporters. This became readily apparent during the months leading up to the 1995 election, when soldiers already distributing Fujimorean largess also passed along campaign materials to the indigenous people of the highlands.

Fujimori’s successes in dealing with both the economic restructuring and putting down the Sendero rebellion gave credence to his claim that a strong party system in Peru had been one of the sources of all the state’s problems. Short-term successes caused the Peruvian populace to agree with him. Furthermore, his legislature passed laws barring any candidate from pursuing political office if they had charges pending against them during the time of the election. This served as an implicit reminder to the Peruvian citizens that the corrupt officials of former party based governments were still corrupt. It also explicitly kept Alan García both out of the 1995 presidential election and caused him to be the albatross hanging around the neck of APRA, regardless of what candidate ran under their ticket.

While the Peruvian people stood staunchly against political parties in the 1990s, the effects of having only the personalistic Cambio 90/Nuevo Mayoría “movement” holding office discouraged any sort of organized opposition to Fujimori’s policies. While during the beginning of the Fujimori administration there was an assumption that he needed extra latitude to correct the economy and put down the Senderistas, once these issues had been taken care of, popular opinion turned against him in a slowing world economy and popular opposition mounted against him, especially against his taking a third electoral term of office.

Despite a chance for party renewal, Peru’s traditional and mainstream political parties have remained tools for the economic elite. During the Fujimori years they came together under an umbrella organization called the Democratic Forum, however, according to Steven Levitsky, “Because its [the Democratic Forum’s] leaders are widely

(and correctly) perceived to represent the old political class the *Fujimorismo* displaced, the organization has been unable to gain political momentum.”¹⁶ This is a problem because no other method existed to combat the highly populist methods of Fujimori. While the president could claim a direct connection to the people, and claim successes in promoting something for everyone in Peru, the political parties remained immobile and failed to attempt to appeal to the average Peruvian voter. This problem persists to this day. Peruvians are derisive of political parties for good reason. No political party as of yet has worked to implement policies that genuinely benefit the average Peruvian. While a system with strong political parties may be an effective method for bolstering liberal democracy, a system with strongly engrained political parties that serve only a small portion of the population only promotes Latin America’s historic legacy of oligarchy.

“Fujipopulism” – Reaping the benefits

For many years, it was assumed that Latin America would have trouble developing economically due to its inclination to install populist leaders in office. The divide between the policies necessary for international respect as a healthy economy and the policies required of a populist president to please the average voter were always thought to be mutually exclusive. Kenneth Roberts and Moises Arce argue differently, stating, “The Peruvian case suggests that there are contexts in which political leaders can implement market reforms while sustaining lower-class political support.”¹⁷

Fujimori lost much of the trust of his primary constituency during the “Fujishock.” This was effectively demonstrated in the voting for the 1993 Constitution. The new Constitution barely passed at a margin of 53 percent in favor over 47 percent against, and was widely seen as a referendum on Fujimori’s performance to date, especially in light of his *autogolpe* in April of 1992. It was during this time that he gained the nickname, “The President of Lima,” because the “Fujishock” was seen as merely a policy to help Lima elites make more money and continue leaving rural citizens out in the cold.¹⁸ Fujimori gained more votes from upper class Peruvians, but lost much ground with his traditional voter base.

While this opinion might have suited Fujimori under the Constitution in effect when he was elected, now that he had the option of reelection the large numbers of votes from the poor drastically overpowered his needs for the support of the Limeños. Therefore, he instituted a massive public works construction program in the poorest areas of the Andean highlands—precisely the areas that he had lost ground with when he implemented the “Fujishock.” Public works construction was concentrated in agencies responsible to the executive, not the legislative, branch, such as FONCODES.¹⁹ He furthermore increased his name and face recognition by dedicating many of the works in person. It was no accident that after Fujimori began personally dedicating so many of his projects that laws were passed mandating that pictures of candidates appear on the ballots for the 1995 presidential race.

However, it is important to realize that the policies usually associated with “Fujipopulism” were effected only directly before the 1995 election and ended shortly after. The main purpose of infrastructure improvement was not to improve Peru, but to improve Fujimori’s image as he prepared to enter the 1995 presidential election. It is no surprise then that he won in the first round with 64.4 percent of the vote, negating a runoff.²⁰

Post-1995 Election – the Law of Unintended Consequences

These twin pillars of macroeconomic austerity combined with direct public aid in the form of infrastructure construction were highly effective in building short-term electoral support for Fujimori. In fact, direct public spending was not dissimilar to what Alan García did during the years after his brazen decision to limit Peru's debt servicing to 10 percent of export GDP. Neither were sustainable policies. When García decided to spend massively, he depleted Peru's foreign reserves. Fujimori, however, had windfall government revenues from privatizing state-owned companies. Whereas García's public spending only exacerbated Peru's economic woes, Fujimori spent only small amounts of what Peru took in and augmented it with aid from international donors, an option denied to García after the default. Both, however, were limited by a finite amount of revenue. The difference laid in Fujimori's judicious use of public finance and García's irresponsible spending. But, because public spending is a highly expensive form of government largess, Fujimori could not continue to spend on such a massive scale after securing reelection in 1995, nor would he want to spend government funds to finance projects with no political kickback for him.

Thus, while economic austerity was an economically sound and politically safe choice for Fujimori, direct government spending (while still maintained by requiring local governments to draw money from central funds) had to fall if economic austerity was to be maintained. Therefore, Fujimori maintained austerity to please the elites of Lima (more important during non-electoral seasons) and allowed direct spending to drop. "Fujipopulism" did not so much end as much as it was phased out after it served its purpose as a reelection tool.

Fujimori as a Candidate for 2000 – Breakdown of Support

According to research by Kurt Weyland, the state of the economy in Peru influences public opinion similarly to the way it does in America.²¹ Economic success is rewarded with longstanding high approval ratings while political accomplishments receive less appreciation. Regarding the Fujimori regime, it received significantly higher approval ratings that stayed in effect for longer periods of time once the market stabilized than it did after the capture of Abimael Guzman. While the political success of capturing Guzman created a spike of increased approval ratings higher than that of economic stabilization, the less sharp increases for economic successes lingered longer than the effects of effectively ending the Sendero revolution. This suggests that Fujimori's performance with the economy leading up to the 1995 election was more important in the voters' minds than the more recent and more visible capture of Guzman. Similar results occur for the peace negotiation with Ecuador, although the possibility remains that voters were initially satisfied with Fujimori's securing the peace and then less appreciative when they learned the terms of that peace.

Fujimori's economic performance changed very little during his second term. There was no major economic restructuring to be done, which may have been a blessing for Peru but a curse for its President. Peru slid into recession during the late 1990s due to droughts caused by El Niño and the reverberations of the Asian Financial Crisis. It experienced less growth (although a slowdown in growth was inevitable moving from growth rates about 13 percent after the "Fujishock" stabilized to economy) and moved close to recession with a .3 percent growth in 1998.²²

Despite Peru's movement into recession, its economy was structurally sound. There was no need for a new "Fujishock" followed by an *autogolpe* to jump-start the Peruvian economy. It was simply slowing down. Thus, Fujimori did not have the backing necessary to declare emergency measures. Fujimori's approval ratings, always over 50 percent during his first term, fell to the mid-thirties.

Moving into the 2000 election, Peruvians have simply tired of Fujimori. While he was seen as the right man to economically structure Peru, the economy had been restructured and the people of Peru were tired of authoritarian government—especially authoritarian government playing at being democratic. As Larry Diamond notes, "Publics may be committed to the idea of democracy in principle but be so disillusioned and disgusted with its failures in their own country that they may judge it an inappropriate form of government *for their country, at the time.*"²³ It is highly possible that while the *autogolpe* was wildly popular in Peru when it happened, Peruvians decided that the time for a strong man who could make decisions in government had ended. At the time, "Peruvians essentially converted Fujimori into a 'democratic dictator,' delegating extraordinary power to him in a context of profound crisis."²⁴ As the Fujimori presidency progressed, according to David Scott Palmer, "many Peruvians believe that their country once again has a government that works, and that a strong hand at the helm has had much to do with this."²⁵ The economy was not in the best condition, but did not need any restructuring. Thus, the main feature in supporting a Peruvian president's approval rating, economic performance, turned against him. The economy was not failing, it was just falling.

As the 2000 election approached, Fujimori increasingly searched for a Constitutional interpretation that would allow him to run for a third term. Finally, after much shuffling of the Constitutional Tribunal and forcing silence on the part of the National Election Board, the 1993 Constitution was interpreted giving Fujimori an opportunity to run for reelection because the 1995 election constituted his first election under the new constitution. Civil society groups, many of which had formed out of the *rondos campesinos* nurtured by Fujimori just a few years ago, and Foro Democratico collected 1,441,053 signatures in a petition asking for a national referendum on the question of his reelection.²⁶ Congress, controlled by Cambio 90/Nuevo Mayoría, declined to submit the issue to public debate. However, all throughout this time Fujimori resurrected his public works campaign of 1994 and 1995.

Fujimori won the first round of the 2000 election, although with just under the majority required to forgo a run-off against the second place finisher: Alejandro Toledo. Toledo cried foul at the election practices and boycotted the second round. Fujimori had his third term, although it was inadvertently ended when videotapes taken by his second-in-command, Head of the National Intelligence Services (SIN) Vladmiro Montesinos, fell into the hands of the media. Overnight, opposition to Fujimori skyrocketed. Fujimori scheduled an immediate state visit to Japan, where he faxed in his resignation. Another election, between Alejandro Toledo and former president Alan García produced the Toledo presidency of today.

Conclusion

Due to the policies commonly considered "Fujipopulism," from the elimination of the Senderistas to direct public works, Peru advanced beyond needing Fujimori. While

he fixed the structure of the Peruvian economy and defeated the Sendero guerillas, he made to mistakes for his electoral career by aiding Peru. First of all, once the economy stabilized from the “Fujishock,” Peruvians expected a healthy economy and were not pleased when it turned sour in the late 1990s. While Peruvians recognized that their economy did not need another restructuring, Fujimori’s success in implementing the “Fujishock” raised the bar of expectations for his economic performance in the future. It is questionable whether this means that all presidents will be held to a standard of Fujimori’s first term performance or whether President Toledo will receive more leniency in public opinion because he has not restructured an economy, despite his credentials for doing so.

Secondly, much of the success in the Peruvian military’s campaign against Sendero Luminoso was due to the support given by the rural population, specifically the *rondos campesinos*. While the *campesinos* were an effective force in promoting Fujimori’s reelection during the 1995 campaign, during the years after 1995 they evolved into civil society groups effective in mobilizing *against* allowing Fujimori a third chance in office.

Thus, Diamond’s thesis about democracy holds true. Not only did Peru pursue significant steps toward democratic consolidation, it moved forward by moving backwards. While the April 5, 1992 *autogolpe* was a blatantly anti-democratic act, the policies that the Fujimori government passed both stabilized the Peruvian economy and created civil society groups so necessary to the maintenance of liberal democracy. While Peruvians may not have considered democracy the best choice for their government in 1992, it is clear that their opinion again favored democracy by the late 1990s. Unfortunately for Fujimori, his very actions to promote a Peru in which he ruled indefinitely only developed Peru and laid the groundwork for the forces that eventually undid his presidency.

Furthermore, Diamond’s thesis that Peru did not consider democracy the right government for themselves at the time is borne out in events since Toledo’s election. While Toledo has taken to some Fujimori-esque actions, such as having the military distribute relief and dedicating public works projects while in native dress, Toledo ran on a platform against government corruption. It is doubtful in the extreme that the Stanford educated anti-corruption president will pursue his predecessor’s course. It is less likely that he would be able to if he tried. While Fujimori nominally returned power to the legislative branch with the new constitution, he did so at the insistence of international lenders. It is more likely that domestic forces would stop any future president attempting an *autogolpe*. One of his first acts, as had been done by presidents Belaundé, García, and Fujimori, was asking Congress for far-reaching policy-making power in economics. This session, however, Congress denied a president that power for the first time since the end of military rule in 1980. The Peruvian Congress did pass the resolutions Toledo communicated through Prime Minister Daniño, but only after debating each of them first.²⁷ It seems that the lessons of Fujimori are more than those of how to develop a country.

Some negative lessons also have been taught, specifically that when the legislative branch delegates it’s power to the executive the legislative branch may not get that power back. Furthermore, one power delegated only makes the situation that much easier for the executive to usurp more and more power. In the final analysis, Fujimori did

usurp democracy in many significant ways during his presidency. He closed Congress during the *autogolpe* and during the intervening time while an assembly debated a new constitution, he concentrated as much power as possible in the executive branch. However, he stabilized the dying Peruvian economy, decimated Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso, and promoted civil society at the same time (if only inadvertently). The Fujimori regime can be seen as temporary steps backwards in the larger process of democratic consolidation in Peru.

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