The turmoil in the Congo from 1960-1964 is commonly seen as merely another manifestation of the Cold War in a new Third World setting, with Soviet and Chinese aggression countered by the United Nations representing Western interests.[1] However, the truth of the situation is much more complex. Distinct elements of nationalism, foreign investment interests, racial tensions, neocolonialism, and pure lust for power all played their roles along side the specter of armed communist aggression in this newly independent nation.

Although there are a wide variety of colorful characters involved on all sides of the Congo situation, one of the most prominent, by virtue of his tenacity if nothing else, was Moise Tshombe. On July 11, only 17 days after the official independence of the Congo from Belgium, Tshombe, President of the Katanga Province, announced in a radio broadcast that region’s “total independence” from the Congo.[2] This brash action was the beginning of four years of conflict and turmoil that followed Congo’s independence. Tshombe’s secession brought conflicting reactions from all over the world. The Belgians continued to support him, as did many European business interests, in part because Katanga is the richest province of the Congo. Conservatives in the United States saw him as the only alternative to the communist downfall of all of central Africa. Despite this, official United States policy was firmly behind the United Nations and against secession. Likewise, few nations in the world recognized Katanga as a legitimate nation.

However, in only four years, Tshombe would become the Premier of the Congo, the very nation from which he had seceded. In this new position, the United States government provided direct support to Tshombe’s government, completing what appeared to many to be a total reversal in our policy. Despite the fact that providing aid to Tshombe’s Congo government was a change in the United States policy towards Tshombe personally, it represented no variation in our overall course of action.

From the beginning of the troubles in the Congo, the United States took a firm position behind the United Nations in supporting the elected government of the Congo, consisting of President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba. Kasavubu and Lumumba originally appealed to the United Nations for help in calming various armed rebellions throughout the country.[3] On July 12, the Congolese government asked the United States for troops to help hold the nation together and prevent further bloodshed. President Eisenhower promptly ruled out the use of American troops in the Congo, even as part of a United Nations contingent. He did not believe that any of the large Western powers should become intimately involved in the Congo conflict by sending troops. However, the administration indicated their support for the UN mission by stating that the United States “would extend every facility to an expeditionary force to the Congo if one is raised.”[4] American policy makers generally felt that with the assistance of UN forces with respect to security and technology, Lumumba would be able to resist Communist pressures.

At this point the UN forces were not expressly concerned with Tshombe and the Katanga secession. Although the United States supported the UN policy that troops should be allowed into Katanga, the Eisenhower administration firmly believed that the UN could not be drawn in to the internal dispute over secession at this point. The administration took a less vehement position towards Tshombe. Indeed, in some spheres of the administration, Tshombe was preferred over Lumumba. Tshombe protected white lives and property, and demanded political autonomy viewed as appropriate for tribal Africa. Katanga was thought to be much more stable than the Congolese government under Lumumba.[5]

The Security Council ruled in accordance with American opinion that no UN forces should be used to affect the outcome of any internal conflict. With this assurance, Tshombe allowed the UN forces to enter Katanga on August 12.[6] Over the next six months the Congolese government fell into constant turmoil. Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and replaced him with Joseph Ileo. Lumumba rejected the legality of this action and in turn dismissed Kasavubu. On September 14, the army chief of staff, Joseph Mobutu, seized control of the government, and reinstated Kasavubu as president.[7]

Along with this change in government came a change in UN policy. Belgium was asked to withdrawal all of its personnel that were at the disposal of the Congolese government. Reasoning behind such a request came from the UN’s fear that the Belgians were disrupting the return to constitutional government by their actions.[8] This alteration in UN strategy did not result in any change in the United State’s policy. Although the U.S. continued to support UN actions, it also furthered its relations with Katanga and Tshombe. Katanga was allowed to organize a miniature embassy in New York City, and agents for Tshombe helped to create support in the US. Although there was no possibility of direct support for the Katangese government, a cordial relationship had been established.[9]

Meanwhile, further chaos reigned in the Congo. In December, Antione Gizenga, a former deputy Prime Minister in Lumumba’s government, proclaimed himself Prime Minister and set up his own leftist government in Stanleyville rather than the capital Leopoldville. This government was recognized by most communist and Arab nations as legitimate. On January 17, 1961, Lumumba was captured, and eventually shot on direct order from Tshombe but the death was not reported until February 12.[10] In the midst of this governmental confusion, the American Embassy, in combination with other interests, tried to find a strong leader that would provide a political replacement to Lumumba to head the central government. They quickly came up with Cyrille Adoula, a nationalist who had broken away from the Lumumba faction because of his dictatorial style of governing. [11] Adoula was confirmed as Prime Minister on August 2, 1961.[12]

Official UN intervention in the Katanga secession was finally permitted by a Security Council resolution on February 21, 1961. The resolution called for the unification of the Congo with the use of force if necessary to prevent civil war, the immediate withdrawal of foreign military personnel, and the convening of the Congolese Parliament.[13] The United States of course professed its approval of this course of action. This endorsement was most evident in the United States’ continued funding for the UN actions in the Congo. For every dollar raised by the UN to pay for the war through October 1961, the United States paid 73 cents.[14]

During this time period, the summer and early fall of 1961, American policy towards Tshombe took an adverse turn. The UN force launched a limited military action against Tshombe’s forces in September. Rather than achieving a quick victory, the UN forces suffered terrible damages in fighting that lasted for eight days. Public opinion began to turn against Tshombe, and the U.S. government placed itself staunchly behind the UN mandate.[15] G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs stated, “Katangan secessionism has obstructed the clear aims of the United Nations. It is furthermore, viewed with alarm as promoting instability on the African Continent.”[16]

The situation in Katanga slipped into violence again in December but Secretary of State Dean Rusk made sure that the United States held its ground behind the UN. On December 8, he stated, “Our aim is the consolidation of the country under a stable government which will be able to pursue freely the true national interests of the Congolese.” Rusk emphasized the United States’ desire for a peaceful solution to the Katanga problem, without which he felt the entire country would be opened to Communist penetration.[17] The U.S. Government worked actively with the United Nations to prevent actions by the UN forces that would jeopardize the chances for peace in the Congo.[18]

Unsuccessful negotiation efforts between Adoula and Tshombe persisted throughout 1962 as the United States continued to favor the UN standpoint and the Adoula government. By July 1962, the United States Government strengthened its position against Tshombe. On July 19, Washington denounced the intransigence of Tshombe and threatened him with “all possible measures” short of military action if the secessionist activities did not cease.[19] President Kennedy emphasized that Tshombe’s ongoing resistance to negotiation was likely to increase the level of chaos in the Congo even more. G. Mennen Williams repeated these sentiments again in November, stating:

Continued Katangese secession does indeed create a climate for renewed disorder – disorder that would be dangerous not only to the Province of Katanga but to the entire Congo, to the African Continent as a whole, and to the peace of the world as well. There is an urgent need for a rapid end to the Congo crisis.[20]

The Katanga policy of the United States continued to stiffen in the month of December. On the 17^th, the United States turned away from economic sanctions and the National Security Council decided to grant the UN whatever equipment necessary to reintegrate Katanga by force.[21] At this point in American policy, the fear of Communist influence played a large role in determining further actions. There was a prominent fear that unless Katanga was reintegrated quickly Adoula would fall, and there would be a sharp rise in Communist influence in the Congo.[22] On the 28^th of December, the UN prematurely began to execute its plan for the final downfall of Katanga. It found the fighting much easier than before as Tshombe’s troops had become extremely demoralized. Only two weeks later, on January 14, 1963, the Katangan ministers announced the end of secession and granted the UN freedom of movement throughout the region. A joyful Harlan Cleveland announced:

The Congo is about to be free and whole again. It is moving toward law and order. The secessionist bubbles have burst. There are no uninvited foreign troops, no Communist enclaves, no ‘army of liberation,’ no reason for a single American soldier to die there, no excuse for a Soviet soldier to live there… No other organization could have done so much. If the United Nations had not existed, the responsible members of the world community might have had to invent it.[23]

Moise Tshombe retreated from his once proud seat of power to self-imposed exile in Spain.

The United States Government continued to provide aid to Adoula and without the problem of Katanga to worry about, the future for the Congo looked brighter. However, a year following Tshombe’s surrender the nation was again in pieces as Rebellions ripped through the country. By August, antigovernment forces controlled roughly half of the Congo.[24] On the last day of June 1964, Prime Minister Adoula resigned. Out of this progressively worsening situation rose a familiar face. The head of the new government was none other than Moise Tshombe.

When it was first rumored that Tshombe would be making a return to Congolese politics, the Americans did not have a uniform stance. However, as time progressed they came to realize that it would be far better to incorporate Tshombe into the government rather than see him join one of the various revolutionary forces or begin a new secessionist movement. Although in general the Americans favored Adoula as Prime Minister, they did not make any objections to Tshombe. On July 6, without any effort from the United States to halt the appointment, Tshombe was named Prime Minister.[25]

With Tshombe the head of a government that the United States had consistently supported through several different leaders and years of turmoil, America continued to support the government. The New York Times reported, “President Johnson offered understanding and cooperation today to Premier Moise Tshombe of the Congo. He thus completed an official change of attitude toward a man Washington had vigorously opposed.”[26] Johnson recognized the vast change in position that came with Tshombe’s new post. The United States shared many of his objectives for the still very young nation of the Congo, and pledged him full support for his endeavors. Johnson stated, “We are going to be as cooperative and helpful as we can and attempt to see that the people of the area have as good a government as is possible and we have every intention of being understanding and cooperative.”[27]

In the relatively short historical time span of only four years, the Congo saw far more than its fair share of trouble, and Moise Tshombe was involved in the majority of troublesome incidents. Because of his consistent presence in the Congo during this time period, the United States policy towards Tshombe varied widely over the years. There were times when he was the worst enemy, and times when he was the best collaborator for US policies, and notably there were very many times in between these two extremes. Because of this, the final shift in giving Tshombe full support as Prime Minister was not quite as radical a change as it looked. We had supported him before, and even more remarkably, we had continuously supported the government that he became the head of. Tshombe played the roles of both friend and foe.

Cleveland, Harlan. “Good Case in the Congo.” Department of State Bulletin, 2 July 1962, 18-24.

Epstein, Howard M. Revolt in the Congo 1960-64. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1965.

Hatch, John. “The Congo: Hostages, Mercenaries and the CIA.” The Nation, 14 December 1964, 452-455.

Hay, Russell. “Everybody’s Problem Child.” The New Republic, 27 April 1963, 10-12.

“If Lumumba Remains in Power, Congo Will Go Communist.” U.S. News & World Report, 5 September 1960, 60-61.

“In the Congo – The Reds are Winning After All.” U.S. News & World Report, 9 October 1961, 87-91.

Kalb, Madeleine G. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982.

Lefever, Ernest W. Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1965.

____________. Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.

Meyers, Albert J. “The Congo: Going, Going.” U.S. News & World Report, 13 March 1961, 46-47.

_________. “Tshombe Talks About U.S. Role in the Congo.” U.S. News & World Report, 3 August 1964, 50-51.

“Moise Tshombe’s Congo Comeback.” U.S. News & World Report, 20 July 1964, 21.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Challenge of the Congo. New York: International Publishers, 1967.

Paterson, Thomas G., Clifford, J. Garry, and Hagan, Kenneth J. American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995.

“Security Council Acts To End Secessionist Activities and Reestablish Political Unity in the Congo.” Department of State Bulletin, 25 December 1961, 1061-1069.

Stevenson, Adlai E. “U.S. Informs UN of Withdrawal of Congo Rescue Mission.” Department of State Bulletin, 21 December 1964, 891.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert. “War in Congo: The Wedge for Another Red Take-Over.” U.S. News & World Report, 2 October 1961, 46-47.

“What Comes Next in the Congo.” U.S. News & World Report, 1 January 1962, 28-29.

“What Comes Next in the Congo?” U.S. News & World Report, 2 October 1961, 43-45.

Weissman, Stephen R. American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.

_________. “CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences.” Political Science Quarterly 94 (summer 1979): 263-286.

Williams, G. Mennen. “The Lessons of the Congo.” Department of State Bulletin, 23 October 1961, 668-671.

_______________. “The Urgent Need for Congo Reconciliation.” Department of State Bulletin, 26 November 1962, 803-806.

“Will the Congo be Another Vietnam?” U.S. News & World Report, 21 December 1964, 34-35.

[1] This viewpoint offered in brief in Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895 Vol. II (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 393-394. See also Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.).

[2] “Katanga Premier in Congo Secedes, asks Belgian Aid,” New York Times, 12 July 1960, 1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Congo Urges U.S. to Send Troops; Plea is Rejected,” New York Times 13 July 1960, 1.

[5] Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 75.

[6] Howard M. Epstein, Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64 (New York: Facts on File, Inc. 1965), 26.

[7] Ibid. 47.

[8] Weissman, American Foreign Policy, 102.

[9] Ibid. 103.

[10] Ibid. 77.

[11] Ibid. 105.

[12] Epstein, Revolt in the Congo, 99.

[13] Robert Strausz-Hupe, “War in Congo: The Wedge for Another Red Take-Over,” U.S. News & World Report, 2 October 1961.

[14] “What comes next in the Congo?” U.S. News & World Report, 2 October 1961, 43.

[15] Ibid.

[16] G. Mennen Williams, “The Lessons of the Congo,” Department of State Bulletin, 23 October 1961, 671.

[17] E.W. Kenworthy, “U.S. Backs UN on Katanga but 2 Allies are Dubious; Hospital hit in fighting.” New York Times, 9 December 1961, 1.

[18] E.W. Kenworthy, “Kennedy Seeking a Katanga Truce and Congo Unity,” New York Times, 15 December 1961, 1.

[19] Max Frankel, “Tshombe’s Stand Denounced by U.S.” New York Times, 20 July 1962, 1.

[20] G. Mennen Williams, “The Urgent Need for Congo Reconciliation.” Department of State Bulletin, 26 November 1962, 803.

[21] Weissman, American Foreign Policy, 183.

[22] Ibid. 184.

[23] As quoted in Weissman, American Foreign Policy, 191.

[24] Ibid. 195.

[25] Ibid. 234.

[26] Max Frankel, “President Offers Backing for Tshombe in the Congo.” New York Times, 25 July 1964, 1.

[27] Ibid. 2

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