Recent history of troubles

In May 1998, B.J. Habibie succeeded Suharto’s 32 year authoritarian reign as Indonesia’s president.  The following year in the first open and freely contested election in 33 years, Abdurrahman Wahid became Indonesia’s next president.  His coalition government has been dealing with much internal strife based on religious, ethnic, and separatist conflicts throughout the country.  While violence and separatist movements have mushroomed all over the archipelago, Wahid first has the daunting task of dismantling the remnants of Suharto’s personalized government.  In his 33 years, President Suharto created a highly networked government, the foundation of which was a loyalty to himself¹.

There are several current conflicts in Indonesia, all of which are rooted in Suharto’s transmigration policy of 30 years ago.  To alleviate the population crisis facing the nation, Suharto transplanted poor, landless farmers from such densely populated areas as Java, Bali, and Madura to relatively unpopulated “outer islands.”  These islands were inhabited by the Dayaks, a generic term used to group the many different tribes of the area².

The immediate tensions between the Dayaks and the Madurese were economic.  The government had parceled land out to the Madurese, who soon took control of local trading and logging, robbing the Dayaks of their traditional hunting grounds.  These economic concerns soon were blurred with religious differences as the Dayaks were predominantly Christian and the Madurese were staunch Muslims.  The government, however, made no efforts to alleviate these tensions it had created by the sudden cohabitation forced upon these distinctly different ethnic and religious groups².  As Munir, director of the Indonesian human rights group Committee on Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, says, “The Dayaks have converted the Madurese into a symbol of government power and the process of economic marginalization.  Unless the government develops the political will to provide systemic answers, this will keep happening,” referring to the ongoing violence between the two groups².  Since January 1999, estimates of death tolls range from 5,000 to 8,000 with approximately 500,000 people displaced from their homes³.  Government responses to the outbreaks of violence have been meager at best.  Poorly trained and equipped military forces are spread thinly and in come places even engage in fighting against local police.  Corruption is also widespread as locals say both the military and the police extort money from refugees in exchange for safe passage².

If these conflicts spread (they already have from the Moluccan islands to Lombok, 25 miles outside of Bali) to urban areas, the integrity of the republic will be at stake.  It is important to contain the spread of violence and prevent it from reaching such places as Sulawesi and Kalimantan (where the non-Muslim population is high), and Java, where a great majority of the middle class lives⁴.

A problem related to ethno-religious tensions is the birth of secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya since the East Timorese secession referendum in August 1999.  Both of these areas are rich in natural resources but subject to Jakarta’s mercantilist policies, leaving them mired in poverty and conflict while Jakarta reaps all the profits.  Maintaining these two regions within the republic is very important because experts predict that successful separation would catalyze other regions to do the same, leaving Indonesia as merely Java and parts of Sumatra.  Such a shift could cause major instability in South-east Asia⁴.

Reacting to these problems, the government has a begun a widespread devolution campaign set on appeasing the concerned regions.  The concept is to allow provinces to keep more of the wealth generated through their natural resources and also grant them greater political autonomy.  Even this proposition, however, faces opposition, mostly from Christians who fear the increased power will encourage regional governments to proclaim Islam as the official religion.  This step may lead to Indonesia becoming an Islamic country, furthering Christians’ secessionist tendencies.

Wahid, despite the inept nature of his government, is a man who cherishes pluralism and seeks tolerance.  He is seen to be the best man to keep violence from being fueled by government rhetoric.  His efforts to reconcile the religious communities in Indonesia have garnered him praise and the endorsement from the United States⁴.  This move has calmed many observers who believe that US intervention will be the only way to untangle the mess.

Recently, conflicts have sprung up in Borneo, except Wahid does not enjoy the same popular support because he began a 14-day official overseas trip just as the fighting began.  Many see his decision to not stay at home during this trouble as a change in his attitude.  Some go so far as to say he would rather go on vacation than remain in Indonesia to address problems.  “How can we expect the international community to care about the tragedy in Borneo when our own national leader would rather go sightseeing than stop this bloodshed,” says Munir.  The criticism has reached such a fevered pitch that Wahid’s political opposition leaders have promised to impeach him upon his return⁵.

On top of all these difficulties, the economy is still in shambles after the Asian economic crisis of 1997.  Many foreign investors pulled out at that time and today there are still many people with large bank debts⁴.  Further, the banking system collapse forced many “tycoons” to give up their industrial stakes to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency while the government has increased its corporate holdings since the crisis.  The cause for concern is that many of these industries, especially energy, telecoms, and transport are failing with a lack of foreign investment and technology to boost productivity⁶.  The primary goal now is to attract foreign investors to come back, a feat that is increasingly difficult in light of the ethnic and political turmoil.

American Interests and Goals

Despite its problems, Wahid’s government has insisted that foreign intervention is unnecessary; the conflicts are merely internal⁷.  Regardless of its claims to the contrary, it seems unlikely that the government will be able to pull itself out of this crisis if left alone.  This situation is of high importance to the American government.  Southeast Asian stability is vital to American security interests because Indonesia, and its sea lanes, is midway between the Middle East and northern Asia.  This stability is gravely threatened by the possible collapse of this central state in the region.  This is especially true due to Indonesia’s role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the group’s counterbalancing force against the northern part of the continent⁵.

Security is the primary US interest in Indonesia.  China, North Korea, and Pakistan are potential major concerns to American national interests, as well as US allies, and Indonesia lies midway between this area of concern and the perpetually tumultuous Middle East.  The security interest can be broken down into three individual stabilization goals: political, economic, and humanitarian.  Overall, Indonesian stabilization would serve as a permanent and vital US:  interest, the promotion of world order.  By ensuring the vitality of the Indonesian state, the US avoids a potential power vacuum in Southeast Asia that China could easily fill.

Political stabilization is the lynchpin to success in Indonesia.  With concerns over Wahid’s leadership capabilities and talk of impeachment, millions of Wahid loyalists have promised that efforts to remove him from power will be met with violent opposition.  Along with being a Muslim religious leader, many see him as a genius and a saint.  The Nahdlatul Ulama, arguably the world’s largest Muslim organization, declares that those seeking to remove Wahid from office are merely searching for a scapegoat.  Some of its members also claim they have formed groups of “suicide militants, ready to die defending Gus Dur,” as he is known⁸.  Calming these tensions and allowing either Wahid or his successor to take control of the state peacefully will pave the way for economic and humanitarian efforts to revive the Indonesian way of life.

American economic interests are crucial in the lucrative Asian market.  A drive for privatization of public sectors would open up an incredibly vast market for American firms.  American investment could be an incredibly prosperous venture for a nation with population of well over 200 million.  Economic aid could also potentially address such “low intensity threats” as piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal logging and trading¹⁰.

Most importantly, Indonesia’s sea lanes are critical to American oil interests.  More than half the world’s shipping goes by these passages, a significant portion being Middle Eastern oil bound for allied nations Japan and Korea as well as the US^9.  Further, economic stability would quell many of the root concerns that began the conflicts from the days of Suharto’s transmigration policy.  To give economic security back to the Dayaks might very well pacify much of their aggressive and resentful actions against the Madurese and the Muslim population in general.

The lesson the US and UN must learn from East Timor is that whatever force is sent to the area must be able to deal with the violence that exists.  In such an explosive area it cannot be assumed that some measure of political or economic stabilization will end all violence.  The post-referendum violence in East Timor is evidence of that.  The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) were not equipped to deal with the violence that erupted, which allowed the Indonesian military-backed militias to inspire fear and terror through a campaign of total destruction across the newly independent state¹¹.  In light of these lessons, the US’s goals would be served best with a two-pronged UN or ASEAN action aimed at political restructuring and humanitarian relief.  American leadership in this area would not only directly serve its interests, but would serve the non-vital interests of promoting international goodwill and the strengthening of international institutions such as the UN and ASEAN.

Great Britain shares the US’s concern in Indonesia.  Defense Secretary Geoffrey Hoon said in March 2001 that Indonesia “is a matter of concern to this region and also to the international community...Right now, we have to be supportive to ensure there is internal stability [there]”¹⁰.  This must be the US’s primary goal in Indonesia as well, to ensure internal stability.  This is the only way to maintain our interests in Southeast Asia, and be a legitimate power there to prohibit the growth in strength of China and North Korea.

American policy implications and recommendations

American policy towards Indonesia is quite complicated.  In Southeast Asia we have already intervened in two wars, both of which were “aberrations of policy and errors of strategy”⁹.  One was the Philippine war for independence from Spain in 1898 and the other was Vietnam.  In the Philippines, we threatened peace with Japan whereas in Vietnam we achieved nary a goal and lost 60,000 lives in the effort.  Although currently there is no war in the region, we must be “attentively engaged” in respect to the rule of law, education, health, and business interests.  In light of the power vacuum forming in Indonesia as a result of the political unrest, the US must look for ways to contain the spread and escalation of current conflicts as well as ways to keep ourselves out of regional conflicts⁹.

The US involved itself with Indonesia in 1975, the year it pulled out of Vietnam and Cambodia.  Concerned with the further spread of communism, the US urged Indonesia, under Suharto, to occupy East Timor to keep it from becoming an equivalent of Cuba to Australia¹².  Involvement with Suharto, a known dictator, also kept him from taking Indonesia as a whole down the communist path.

Involvement today is somewhat more precarious than it was during the Suharto era.  President Wahid has rebuffed foreign aid, repeatedly insisting that the conflict is an internal one that does not require any outside help.  Even if he remains slow to action, attempting troop reinforcements and military command has led to more than 4,000 were killed in fighting in an 18 month period in the Malukus¹³.  While his lack of action may seem the ultimate reason why the international community should involve itself, it would in all likelihood send the political situation into a tailspin.  Wahid would lose all support while taking flak for not being an effective manager of the country, and the populace would lose its sense of sovereignty.  This is especially true as Wahid has repeatedly been censured by the People’s Consultative Assembly, the MPR¹³.

Despite the concerns to state sovereignty and political stability, the international community, especially the United States, in light of its interests in the region of Southeast Asia, must do something to achieve its primary goal: stability, culturally, ethnically, politically, and economically.  The Indonesian government has taken several first steps, devolving certain powers to regions and admitting in July 2000 that it “may ask for international help in the form of equipment and logistics”¹³.  These measures must be followed by actions taken by stronger, secure powers that can exert some kind of stabilizing force upon Indonesia.

Further barriers to foreign involvement are the ban on all foreign embassies in Indonesia and a staunch refusal to allow UN troops onto its soil¹⁴.  National Police Chief General Rusdihardjo remarked, “We object to the presence of United Nations troops in Maluku, as a consequence, we must restore security there soon”¹⁵.  Also, there is a widespread fear of foreign involvement and its implications, especially since the World Bank at one point supported Suharto’s transmigration scheme by awarding Indonesia $5 billion¹⁶.  Also, the sizable portion of the Muslim population which views Wahid as a saint would likely view any foreign venture in the government as an effort to destabilize Wahid’s rule and might possibly react violently.  The existence of the suicide militants only heightens that fear⁸.

Theodore Friend of the Foreign Policy Research Institute puts forth four points of focus for renewal in Indonesia: support from public and private international aid groups for infrastructure overhauls, support for openness and plurality in government, the progress of institutions of civil society (such as the rule of law and transparency), and most importantly the creation of a standing ASEAN  peacekeeping force of 10,000 troops.  This last part must be done not only with the support of all ASEAN states but also Japan, Australia, and the United States.

These policies should be implemented with several immediate goals in mind: to halt the rash of retribution killings and to establish some sort of stability in Indonesia and hence the region.  The first three focuses Friend lays forth offer means to gain stability.  Renewed trust in government, civil institutions, and a revived infrastructure are ways to revitalize a once glorious and steadily growing economy (7 percent rate of gross domestic product growth from 1970 into the mid-1990s) and to redevelop trust in the federal government.  A flow of money into Indonesia would help the nation yet recover from the crisis of 1997, and a strong economy can yield more positive changes, such as a revamped infrastructure, which will affect public involvement and opinion and create a cycle of growth⁹.

In the meantime, the cycle of death and destruction must end.  An international entity, such as ASEAN (with Friend’s proposed standing military force) or the UN, if it offered some sort of pressure to quell the anger of clashing sides, could slow the violence without an expression of neo-colonialism by a western power.  ASEAN plays a key role in stabilizing a region brewing with troubles, dating from Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia to concerns about nuclear capabilities of North Korea, to military tensions between China and its renegade province Taiwan.  Indonesia holds the balance in ASEAN with well over 200 million people, an overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim.  Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, with more Muslims than all the Arab countries combined⁹.  Indonesia knows the role it holds in ASEAN, and thus it could be the most useful tool available to implement these changes within its borders.

In order to implement these changes and to encourage ASEAN to take an active role in its members’ well-being, the United States must take an active, if not direct, role.  Certain church groups and the US State Department have urged the Indonesian government to seek foreign aid and to accept international peacekeepers¹⁷.  Further steps must be taken by the US government to assure Indonesia that it need not fear loss of sovereignty through international involvement.  It must be outlined that the purpose of foreign intervention is not to take control of the situation but to allow for a strong, stable Indonesian government to take control of its state.

The American actors must be the departments of State and Commerce, in coordination with the National Security Council (NSC).  The goals are political and economic stability.  These two departments must make it their duty to allay Indonesian fears of American neo-colonialism.  Indonesia must not feel threatened by American involvement in southeast Asia, but reassured.  American intervention, as the leader of a UN or ASEAN force, must be welcomed as a legitimate means of re-establishing peace.  These goals fall under the broad scope of US interest in Southeast Asia:  security.  The NSC must propose to the American government the general framework of Indonesian policy.  By the nature of the security dilemma in the region, the NSC needs to seek the political, economic, and humanitarian goals as front by the State Department and Commerce Department, however it maintains the broader vision of security in the area.  The NSC must be the coordinating force in leading the American mission in Indonesia.

Conclusions

The United States and its allies have a legitimate concern in the internal upheavals Indonesia is facing in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto regime.  Although its troubles are purely domestic, the combination of ethnic conflict and violence with political unrest has Indonesia on the verge of implosion.  Such an implosion could severely cripple ASEAN and create a power vacuum in southeast Asia ripe for Chinese interference.  The United States must involve itself actively in the political, economic, and ethno-religious well being of Indonesia and its partners in southeast Asia in order to maintain its balance of power with China and other national security concerns such as strategic sea lanes, stable political and social allies.

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        Endnotes

¹BBC News.  3/1/01.  “Suharto–What Next?” http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/indonesia/latest_news/newsid_94000/94244.stm.  15 May, 1998.

²Murphy, Dan.  “Behind the ethnic war, Indonesia’s old migration policy.”  Christian Science Monitor.  Volume 93, Issue 66, p7, 0p, 1c.  1 March, 2001.

³Lampman, Jane.  “US aid groups no longer stand quietly by.”  Christian Science Monitor.  Volume 93, Issue 71, p16, 0p, 1c.  8 March, 2001.

⁴Paris, Jonathan.  Indonesia.  Council on Foreign Relations.  http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/IBIndonesia.html.  1 March, 2001.

⁵Sims, Calvin.  “Borneo Backwater’s Clash Draws Little Notice.”  The New York Times.  3/1/01.   http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/28/world/28INDO.html?pagewanted=all.  28 February, 2001.

⁶"State-owned stockpiles”.  The Economist.  Volume 358, Issue 8215, p58, 2p, 1c.  31 March, 2001.

⁷"Indonesia May Ask Help To Pacify Malukus.”  The New York Times.  Section A, page 6, column 6, Foreign Desk.  The New York Times Company.  July 18, 2000.

⁸Prusher, Ilene R.  “Possible presidential ouster stirs cauldron in Indonesia.”  Christian Science Monitor.  Volume 93, Issue 96, p8, 0p, 1c.  12 April, 2001.

⁹Friend, Theodore.  “Indonesia vital piece of Asian peace; US attention, not intervention, needed to prevent conflict escalation.”  The Washington Times.  News World Communications, Inc.  20 April, 2001.

¹⁰"Hoon: Britain monitoring situation in Indonesia.”  New Straits Times (Malaysia).  National, p6.  New Straits Times Press (Malaysia).  2 March, 2001.

¹¹Schulze, Kirsten E.  “The East Timor Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics.”  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24: 77-82, 2001.  Taylor and Francis.  2001.

¹²Suter, Keith.  “East Timor: On the road to independence.”  Contemporary Review.  Volume 278, Issue 1622, p152, 4p.  March 2001.

¹³Chew, Lee Kim.  “Decisive action needed on Malukus.”  The Straits Times (Singapore).  Commentary analysis, p32.  Singapore Press Holdings Limited.  24 July, 2000.